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How Confidential Are Federal Sector
Employment-Related Dispute Mediations?
PETER MARKSTEINER*
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) scholars consider confidentiality
to be one of the most important ingredients in effective mediation.1 Parties
are willing to discuss their respective interests candidly only if doing so will
not injure their positions should the mediation fail and they find themselves
back in the judicial process. Apparently recognizing both the economic
gains mediation offers and the importance of confidentiality in the
mediation process, lawmakers enacted the Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act (ADRA), 2 which by federal statute guards confidentiality in
certain types of mediations.
Interestingly, the promise-now a statutory promise- of confidentiality
on which mediation is based is potentially at odds with a long standing right
accorded federal and private sector labor unions. Federal labor laws
governing private and public employers grant unions, in general terms, a
right to have a representative present when an aggrieved employee talks
with a representative of management about his grievance. 3 Neither the
National Labor Relations Act4 nor the Federal Service Labor-Management
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I See, e.g., William F. Baron, High-Tech/High Resolution: ADR in Technology
Disputes, Disp. RESOL. J., Apr.-Sept. 1996, at 88, 90; Morton Denlow, Mediating
Commercial Disputes: A Useful Tool for Trial Lawyers and Clients, Disp. RESOL. J.,
Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 79, 82; Jerry Spolter, Checklist for Successful Mediation, DIsp.
RESOL. J., Mar. 1994, at 26, 29; Note, Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation, 98
HARv. L. REv. 441,443-446 (1984).
2 Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-320, 110 Stat.
3870 (1996) (ADRA of 1996) makes permanent the ADRA of 1990, 5 U.S.C. § 571
(1994), as amended by the Administrative Procedure Technical Amendments Act of
1991, 5 U.S.C. § 582 (1994).
3 See 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A) (1994) (Federal Service Labor-Management
Relations Statute, governing public sector labor relations); 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1994)
(section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, governing private sector labor
relations).
4 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
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Relations Statute (FSLMRS)5 states an exception for grievance discussions
that take place in the context of a mediation. Moreover, in the public
sector, Federal Labor Relations Authority (Authority) precedent holds that
a third party, such as a mediator, acting at the behest of the employer is an
extension of the employer for purposes of determining whether the union is
entitled to be present during discussions between the third party and
employees.
The upshot is, whereas mediation promises to be an effective and
efficient way for employers and employees to work out their differences
without diverting substantial resources to lawyers and litigation expenses,
the very aspect of mediation that allows it to work- confidentiality-may
be defeated by the union's right to be present during grievance discussions.
The topic discussed in this Article should be of interest to labor and
employment lawyers, particularly those in the federal sector. In the world
of federal employment, agencies have been directed to implement ADR
programs, and several agencies have been using ADR for some years
already. As federal agencies continue implementing the requirements of the
ADRA, more and more of them will likely turn to mediation as a way to
resolve employment-related disputes. At the same time, and in inverse
relation to unionism in the private sector, public sector labor unions are
growing in numbers. 6 The current state of the law, although decipherable,
is certainly subject to debate. It would therefore behoove practitioners and
adjudicators alike to think about a uniform way to reconcile the competing
interests in this debate earlier rather than later in the evolution of ADR.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years the federal government, and the United States Air Force
in particular, has increased the emphasis placed on resolving all manner of
employment-related disputes by using some alternative to litigation in the
courts. 7 As the amount of litigation increases, 8 federal agency officials are
5 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1994).
6 See Martin H. Malin, Foreword: Labor Arbitration Thirty Years After the
Steelworkers Trilogy, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 551, 562 & n.65 (1990); Clyde
Summers, Unions Without Majority-A Black Hole?, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 531, 547
(1990); Trina Jones, Note, Collective Bargaining in the Federal Public Sector:
Disclosing Employee Names and Addresses Under Exemption 6 of the Freedom of
Information Act, 89 MICH. L. REv. 980, 983 (1991).
7 See generally U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD 97-157, REPORT
TO THE CHAIRMAN, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT,
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looking toward ADR methods to avoid time-consuming and costly
litigation. Mediation is the ADR method most widely and successfully used
by the Air Force. The Air Force mediation model focuses on interest-based
negotiations during which the parties are encouraged to candidly discuss
their respective points of view and given assurances they may do so without
hurting their positions because their discussions will remain confidential.
The Air Force's experience using mediation to resolve workplace
discrimination allegations is still in its infancy, but preliminary data
indicates the use of mediation not only saves money, the nature of the
process also improves the working relationship between the parties and
helps diffuse the adversarial atmosphere that usually develops when a
workplace dispute ends up dividing workplaces into opposing camps that
are forced by the process to choose sides.
The Air Force's decision to increase the use of mediation in
employment-related disputes seems to be welcomed by agency managers
and disgruntled employees. The only potential critics of mediation are the
federal labor unions. The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
Statute gives the bargaining unit's exclusive representative- the union- a
right to be present at all formal discussions between management and
bargaining unit members regarding employee grievances and working
conditions. 9 According to rulings by the courts and the Federal Labor
Relations Authority, in at least a half dozen cases predating the agency's
increased use of mediation, the mediation model used by the Air Force to
try to resolve discrimination complaints involved "[flormal
discussion... concerning any grievances or any personnel policy or
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL SERVICE, ALTERNATIVE DISPuTE RESOLUTION: EMPLOYERS'
EXPERIENCES WITH ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 12 (1997).
8 See COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 25 (1994) [hereinafter
COMMISSION REPORT].
[E]mployment litigation has spiraled in the last two decades. The expansion of
federal and state discrimination laws and the growth in common law and statutory
protection... have provided employees with a broader array of tools with which
to challenge employer behavior in court. In the federal courts alone, the number of
suits filed concerning employment grievances grew over 400 percent in the last
two decades. Complaints lodged with administrative agencies have risen at a
similar rate ....
Id.
9 See 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A) (1994).
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practices or other general condition" 1 0 of employment for bargaining unit
members, and therefore entitled the union to have a representative attend all
such discussions. A conflict arises between the union's rights and a
complainant's rights when participants in a mediation wish to keep matters
discussed during the mediation confidential.
Mediation works because strict confidentiality protections allow the
parties to discuss their respective concerns candidly, allowing the mediator
to assist parties in resolving their disputes according to their respective
interests, rather than entrenched legal positions, which, incidentally,
routinely are not the same. 11 Opposing the confidentiality guarantees that
are essential to effective mediation is the union's statutory right to be
present at all formal discussions of employee "grievances or any personnel
policy or practices or other general condition of employment" 12 of
members of the bargaining unit. Simply stated, effective mediation depends
on confidentiality, but the union, citing 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A), may not
be excluded from such "discussions." 13
In many instances, there may be no actual conflict since a complainant
is free to choose a union member, acting either individually or on behalf of
the union, as his representative during the processing of discrimination
complaints. 14 In other cases, however, the complainant may wish to keep
matters discussed during settlement or conciliation conferences (mediation
by other terms) private and may not want such matters disclosed to the
union or to anyone else. 15 In those cases the conflict is threefold. First, a
statutory conflict exists between the Privacy Act16 and the Administrative
Dispute Resolution Act on the one hand, and the Federal Service Labor-
Management Relations Statute on the other. Second, a policy-oriented
conflict exists between the privacy interest of discriminatees and the
institutional interest of the union in being afforded an opportunity
effectively to represent the bargaining unit. Third, another policy-oriented
conflict exists between the interest of labor unions in general and the public
10 Id.
11 See infra notes 24, 25 and accompanying discussion of "interest-based"
negotiations.
12 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A).
13 See id.
14 See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1614.605(a) (1998).
15 See, e.g., National Air Traffic Controllers Ass'n, 51 F.L.R.A. 115 (1995)
(discussing an employee's refusal to allow an agency to release a copy of the written
settlement of EEO allegations to the union).
16 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994).
[Vol. 14:1 1998]
CONFIDENTIALITY OF FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE MEDIATIONS
interest in favor of finding more efficient alternatives to litigation when
resolving employment-related disputes.
II. AIR FORCE MEDIATION MODEL
Of the various ADR methods, 17 mediation is the ADR technique being
used most widely in government and private industry, 18 and the one that
17The General Accounting Office reported that the five predominant ADR
methods being used by the federal government and private industry were as follows:
[1] Ombudsman: A neutral third party designated by an organization to assist a
complainant in resolving a conflict. An ombudsman provides confidential
counseling, develops factual information, and attempts conciliation between
disputing parties. The power of the ombudsman lies in his or her ability to
persuade the parties to accept his or her recommendations. Ombudsmen are also
called advisors; [2] Mediation: A process in which a trained neutral third party
helps disputants negotiate a mutually agreeable settlement. The mediator has no
authority and does not render a decision but may suggest some substantive options
to encourage the parties to expand the range of possible resolutions under
consideration. Any decision must be reached by the parties themselves; [3] Peer
Review: A panel of employees (or employees and managers) who review evidence
and listen to the parties' arguments to-decide an issue in dispute. Peer review panel
members are trained in the handling of sensitive issues. The panel's decision may
or may not be binding on the parties; [4] Management Review Boards: Similar to
peer review, a panel of managers who review evidence and listen to the parties'
arguments to decide an issue in dispute. Board members are trained in the handling
of sensitive issues. The decision of the board may or may not be binding on the
parties. Also called dispute resolution boards; [5] Arbitration: An adjudicatory
process in which a neutral third party is empowered to decide disputed issues after
hearing evidence and arguments from the parties. The arbitrator's decision may be
binding on the parties either through agreement or operation of law. Arbitration
may be voluntary (i.e., where the parties agree to use it), or it may be mandatory
and the exclusive means available for handling certain disputes.
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 12.
18 See id. at 16.
[U.S. General Accounting Office's (GAO's)] 1995 report showed that of the
private firms using ADR in 1994, about 80 percent used mediation, about 39
percent used peer review panels, and about 19 percent used arbitration. But
according to both EEOC's 1994 and 1996 surveys, most federal agencies using
ADR made only one technique available: mediation.
Id.
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has been considered particularly useful 19 in employment discrimination
cases. 20 The Justice Center of Atlanta21 defines mediation as follows:
Mediation is a dispute resolution process which is non-adversarial in
nature. It seeks not to declare winners or losers, but to find reconciliation
between disputing parties. This process is provided through the skills of a
trained mediator. Its focus is the mutually satisfactory resolution of
disputes, i.e., satisfactory to all disputing parties. No third party acts as
judge and jury. The parties themselves arrive at what each of them agrees
is justice- or at least the best available resolution- through the mediation
process .22
Mediation engenders interest-based, as opposed to position-based
negotiations. 2 3 Interest-based dispute resolution rests on the following
notion:
Traditional methods of dispute resolution do not always get at the real or
underlying issues involved between disputants and that traditional methods
of dispute resolution- lawsuits in the private sector, formal administrative
redress procedures in the federal sector-are predominately position-
based. Simply stated, each disputant stakes out a position-such as a
19 See id.
20 See id. at 17.
Among three of the four federal agencies we studied with experience in mediation,
the limited data available suggested that mediation was more useful than the
traditional processes for resolving discrimination complaints. For example, data
from the Postal Service's Southern California EEO Processing Center showed that
from fiscal year 1988 to fiscal year 1996, about 94 percent of the informal cases
that were mediated were settled, compared with 57 percent of those that went
through traditional counseling.
Id.; see also Cindy Cole Ettingoff & Gregory Powell, Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution
in Employment Related Disputes, 26 U. MEM. L. REv. 1131, 1135 (1996) ("The use of
mediation is increasing. The American Arbitration Association (AAA) conducted 7,161
mediations in 1991 .... This number increased from 5,386 in 1990 and 4,801 in
1989.... According to national figures, mediation leads to the resolution of a dispute
approximately 85% of the time.") (citations omitted).
21 "The Justice Center of Atlanta is a private, nonprofit organization recognized as
one of the leading institutions in the United States for the practice and teaching of
mediation." U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 16 n.23.
2 2 JUSTICE CENTER OF ATLANTA, INC., A MEDIATION MODEL FOR WORKPLACE
DisPuTEs 3 (3d ed. 1997).
23 See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 10.
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complaint of discrimination or a defense against a complaint-and hopes
to win the case. But interest based dispute resolution. .. focuses on
determining the disputants' underlying interests and working to resolve
their conflict at a more basic level, perhaps even bringing about a change
in the work environment in which their conflicts developed? 4
Harvard Law Professor Frank Sander, made a similar observation:
While the adversary method may be ideally suited to the resolution of
sharp conflict over factual issues, there are many other problems for
which it not so well-suited.
... Sometimes that process appears to be so cumbersome that it
develops a life of its own and loses sight of the underlying problems it was
designed to resolve.2 5
As to those underlying problems, Professor Sander observed: "for the
ultimate issue is not who hit whom, but rather how this degenerating
relationship can be constructively restructured."' 26
Several commentators have echoed Professor Sander's opinion about
the advantages mediation has over more traditional means of legal dispute
resolution in terms of improving a relationship between parties that will
most likely continue to have to work and associate with one another
regardless of the outcome of their dispute. 27 It is that very "relationship-
24 Id. at 10-11.
25 Symposium, Current Developments in Judicial Administration: Papers
Presented at the Plenary Session of the American Association of Law Schools,
December, 1977, 80 F.R.D. 147, 187 (1977) (remarks of Frank E. A. Sander as
commentator).
26 Id.
27 See, e.g., Ettingoff & Powell, supra note 20, at 1140; George Friedman,
American Arbitration Ass'n, A Guide to Mediation and Arbitration for Business
People, in INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION: RECOVERY IN THE 1990s AND BEYOND
361, 363 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H-577, 1998);
Lon Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 310 (1970-
1971) (describing the ongoing interdependent relationship that exists between an
employer and a union as a "bilateral monopoly"); Sandra Marin & Sandra A. Sellers,
Negotiating and Preparing for Successful Dispute Resolution, in ADVANCED SEMINAR
ON LICENSING AGREEMENTS 183, 199-200 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, &
Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. G-510, 1998) (discussing benefits of
using ADR in the software industry); Wayne N. Outten, Alternative Dispute Resolution
of Employment Disputes, American Bar Association Center for Continuing Legal
Education, Oct. 15-18, 1997, available in WESTLAW, ABA-LGLED Database,
N97SHCB File.
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maintaining" aspect of mediation which makes it so well-suited for
resolving workplace discrimination allegations. 28 A 1996 study conducted
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Office of
Federal Operations concluded "a sizable number of [EEO]
disputes ... may not involve discrimination issues at all. They reflect,
rather, basic communications problems in the workplace ... [which] may
be brought into the EEO process as a result of a perception that there is no
other forum available to air general workplace concerns." 29
The Air Force has had a good deal of success using mediation to
resolve workplace disputes involving allegations of discrimination. 30 The
Air Force follows a mediation model like that taught by the Justice Center
of Atlanta and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. 31 A civilian
employee who believes he has been discriminated against has, as one
option, the right to contact an EEO counselor and communicate his
concerns. If the EEO counselor is unable to resolve the matter, he may
suggest the parties attempt to mediate. 32 If both the aggrieved employee and
the allegedly offending party agree, the case may be referred to mediation,
where a third party neutral will attempt to help the parties resolve the
dispute. 33
The Air Force mediation process consists of five general steps. First
the mediator introduces himself, discusses his obligation to be impartial,
and explains how the process works. Assuming the parties have no
objection to the mediator, the second step calls for the parties to take turns
making uninterrupted opening statements, during which the mediator and
28 See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNnNG OFFICE, supra note 7, at 11.
29Id. at 11.
30 See id.
31 See id. at 62. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service is an independent
agency created under 29 U.S.C. §§ 172, 173 (1994). Its primary function is to settle
disputes through conciliation and mediation to limit the disruption of the free flow of
commerce caused by labor disputes. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra
note 7, at 22.
32 See infra notes 297-298 and accompanying discussion regarding the proposed
amendment to 29 C.F.R. § 1614 which would also require an EEO counselor, during
the precomplaint interview, to advise aggrieved employees about the opportunity to
mediate disputes.
33 See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 61.
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the parties may take notes if they wish.34 Following opening statements, the
mediator facilitates a joint discussion in step three of the process, in which
the parties are encouraged to talk openly with one another about their
concerns. After the joint discussion, the mediator will hold private
discussions, called caucuses, with each party individually. The duration and
number of caucuses held during step four depends on the facts and
circumstances of each case and how those facts and circumstances are
presented to the mediator. The mediator agrees to hold in confidence,
within the bounds of the law, all matters discussed during these private
caucuses unless the party authorizes the mediator to communicate
something discussed in caucus to the other party. After caucusing with each
party, the mediator conducts another joint session in the fifth and final step,
in which the parties may, if they wish, enter into a written settlement
agreement. At the conclusion of the mediation, regardless of the outcome,
the mediator tears up his notes in the presence of the parties and requests
them to do the same.
Throughout the process, the mediator emphasizes the confidentiality
guidelines applicable to matters discussed at various steps in the mediation.
The mediator also instructs the parties that if anyone requests that they
divulge matters that were confidentially discussed during the mediation they
should contact the Air Force Central Labor Law Office for assistance
ensuring that certain confidentiality protections under the ADRA are not
inadvertently waived.35
The mediator's ability to guarantee the parties that matters discussed
during caucuses will remain confidential is absolutely essential if the
process is expected to work. In addition to the process-oriented justification
for guarding confidentiality during mediations, the courts and the Authority
accord EEO complainants special privacy rights under the law.36 Guarding
34 The mediator informs the parties at the outset that all notes made by any of the
parties during the mediation will be torn up in the company of the other parties and the
mediator prior to concluding the mediation.
35 The Air Force Central Labor Law Office, Rosslyn, Virginia, is the point of
contact for defending confidentiality privileges claimed pursuant to the ADRA.
36 See IRS, Fresno Service Center v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 706 F.2d
1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 1983) ("29 C.F.R. § 1613.213(a) prohibits an EEO counselor
from revealing the identity of a person consulting him before the person files a formal
complaint of discrimination."); National Air Traffic Controllers Ass'n, 51 F.L.R.A.
115, 120-121 (1995); Columbia Typographical Union No. 101, 23 F.L.R.A. 35, 39
n.5 (1986).
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those rights has been seen as critical to achieving one of the primary
objectives Congress intended to further by passing Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act37 - encouraging voluntary compliance with the Act's
requirements. 38 Senator Dirksen, when offering an amendment to Title VII,
remarked: "The maximum results from the voluntary approach will be
achieved if the investigation and conciliation are carried on in privacy. If
voluntary compliance with this title is not achieved, the dispute will be fully
exposed to public view when a court suit is filed." 39 The regulations
governing how EEO complaints are processed set out strict confidentiality
provisions that apply during the "informal" stage of complaint
processing. 4° The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that
"[r]equiring such confidentiality during early stages of an employment
discrimination claim serves to facilitate informal resolution of disputes and
to encourage employees with discrimination complaints to pursue and
explore their claims without fear of retribution. "41
The idea that guarding the privacy of disputants facilitates early
resolution of cases, prior to costly and resource-intensive litigation, 42 has
For examples of. . . conflicts in the private sector resolved in favor of the victim
of discrimination over the exclusive representative, see.. . International Union of
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 18, 26-27 (D.C. Cir.
1980), involving an individual EEO complainant's paramount right to the privacy
and confidentiality of his or her EEO complaint over an exclusive representative's
demand for a copy of the complaint and the employee's identity.
Id.
37 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
38 See 110 CONG. REc. 8193 (1964) (statement of Sen. Dirksen).
39 Id.
40 See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY MANAGEMENT DIRECTIVE No. 110, at 2-23, 2-25 (1992). Note also that
the C.F.R. distinction between "informal" and "formal" complaints has been cited by
the courts to mark the point at which a complainant loses his or her right to
confidentiality in the complaint process. See, e.g., Fresno Service Center, 706 F.2d at
1023 (-29 C.F.R. § 1613.213(a) prohibits an EEO counselor from revealing the
identity of a person consulting him before the person files a formal complaint of
discrimination.... [Ihe EEO counselor... was thus prohibited from informing the
union that he had scheduled a precomplaint conciliation conference .... ") (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted).
41 Fresno Service Center, 706 F.2d at 1023.
42 See VICE PRESIDENT AL GORE, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING A
GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER AND COSTS LESS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
PERFORMANCE REVIEW 119 (1993).
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been codified in the ADRA.
III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION ACT OF 1996
In 1990 Congress, finding that expanding the use of ADR would be a
smarter, faster, more efficient way to resolve certain employment-related
disputes, 43 passed the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990.
"[The Act] required federal agencies to develop ADR policies, [and]
charged the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) with
Federal agencies ... need better and cheaper ways to resolve disputes....
Solving ... disputes can be expensive. It involves high-priced lawyers, it
clogs the courts, and it delays action. Each year, 24,000 litigation matters reach
the 530 full-time attorneys and 220 support staffers employed by the Labor
Department alone. It often takes years to resolve these disputes, postponing the
implementation of important programs and preventing a lot of people from doing
what they are paid to do.
Id.
43 See H.R. 2497, 101st Cong. § 2 (1990) (enacted).
The Congress finds that-
(1) administrative procedure, as embodied in chapter 5 of title 5, United
States Code, and other statutes, is intended to offer a prompt, expert, and
inexpensive means of resolving disputes as an alternative to litigation in the
Federal courts;
(2) administrative proceedings have become increasingly marked by
formality, costs, and delays often result in unnecessary expenditures of time of
individuals and decreased likelihood of achieving consensual resolution of
disputes;
(3) alternative means of dispute resolution.., have been used in the private
sector for many years and, in appropriate circumstances, have yielded decisions
that are faster, less expensive, and less contentious;
(4) such alternative means also lead to more creative, efficient, and sensible
outcomes... ;
(5) such alternative means may be used advantageously in widely varied
administrative programs;
(6) explicit authorization of the use of well-tested dispute resolution
techniques will eliminate ambiguity of agency power under existing law;
(7) Federal agencies may not only receive the benefit of techniques that were
developed in the private sector, but may also take the lead in the further
development and refinement of such techniques; and
(8) the availability of a wide range of dispute resolution procedures, and an
increased understanding of the most effective use of such procedures, will enhance
the operation of the Government and better serve the public.
Id.
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(1) assisting agencies in developing ADR policies and (2) compiling
information on agencies' use of ADR." 44 Congress passed the ADRA of
1996 to "permanently reauthorize[] the 1990 [A]ct and charge] the
President with" designating a replacement for ACUS to be responsible for
"facilitat[ing] and encourag[ing] agency use of ADR. "45 The 1996 Act
followed the growing movement to expand the use of ADR46 in the federal
government.47 The purpose of the ADRA (to encourage the use of ADR in
resolving, among others, employment-related, disputes) 48 jibes seamlessly
with already existing EEO regulations directing federal agencies to "[m]ake
reasonable efforts to voluntarily settle complaints of discrimination as early
as possible in, and throughout, the administrative processing of complaints,
44 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 5.
45 Id.
46 See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, (citing OFFICE OF
FEDERAL OPERATIONS, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION ADR
STUDY (1996)); VICE PRESIDENT AL GORE, NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REvIEW, supra
note 42, at 119.
47 See H.R. 4194 Bill Summary & Status for the 104th Congress (last modified
Sept. 26, 1996) <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d104:HR04194:@@@D>.
(Sec. 2) Includes the use of ombuds and binding or nonbinding arbitration
among ADR procedures, but excludes settlement negotiations. Repeals the current
exclusion and permits parties to use ADR to resolve certain Federal employee-
related disputes involving such matters as retirement, life or health insurance, and
suspension or removal from duty, as well as prohibited personnel practices.
(See. 5) Authorizes a Federal agency to use the services and facilities of
State, local, and tribal governments for ADR purposes.
(Sec. 7) Provides for expedited hiring of neutrals in civilian and defense
agency contracts for use in any part of an ADR process.
Requires that the President shall designate an agency or designate or establish
an interagency committee to facilitate and encourage agency use of dispute
resolution. Directs such agency or interagency committee, in consultation with
other appropriate Federal agencies and professional organizations experienced in
matters concerning dispute resolution, to encourage and facilitate agency use of
ADR and develop procedures that permit agencies to obtain the services of
neutrals on an expedited basis.
Repeals the requirement for the Government to enter into a contract with an
individual on a roster of qualified neutrals or a roster maintained by other public
or private organizations or individual.
Id.
48 See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 5.
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including the pre-complaint... stage" 49 and to "incorporate alternative
dispute resolution techniques into their investigative efforts in order to
promote the early resolution of complaints." 50
As applied to disputes concerning allegations of discrimination, the
threshold question is whether ADR is appropriate to resolve the particular
dispute or controversy in issue. The ADRA directs "[a]n agency. . .[to]
consider not using a dispute resolution proceeding" when one or a
combination of factors is present, 51 such as the potential precedent-setting
aspect of a high profile case. 52
Under the ADRA, there are essentially four elements of a dispute
resolution proceeding. 53 First, the Act covers use of an alternative means of
"dispute resolution [process,]" 54 which by definition includes mediation. 55
Second, the process must be employed to resolve "an issue in
controversy," the definition of which clearly covers EEO complaints of
discrimination (and Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) appeals).56
Third, a neutral will be appointed to serve as "a conciliator, facilitator, or
mediator... at the will of the parties."' 57 The neutral "may be a
permanent or temporary officer or employee of the Federal Government or
any other individual who is acceptable to the parties to a dispute resolution
proceeding." ' 58 In practice, the Air Force will look primarily to officers or
civilian employees within the Department of the Air Force to mediate
49 29 C.F.R. § 1614.603 (1998).
50 29 C.F.R. § 1614.108(b) (1998).
51 5 U.S.C. § 572(b) (1994).
52 See 5 U.S.C. § 572(b)(1).
53 This entire section discussing the key provisions of the ADRA draws heavily
from JOSEPH M. MCDADE, THE ADMINISTRATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AcT OF 1996:
WHAT You NEED TO KNOW TO MAKE IT WORK FOR YOU (1997).
54 5 U.S.C. § 571(3) (1994).
55 The term is defined to mean "[a]n y procedure that is used... to resolve issues
in controversy, including but not limited to... conciliation, facilitation, mediation,
fact-finding, minitrials .... arbitration [and use of ombuds,] or any combination
thereof." Id.
56 The term "'issue in controversy' means an issue which is material to a decision
concerning an administrative program of an agency, and [when] there is [a]
disagreement (A) between an agency and persons who would be substantially affected
by the decision; or (B) between persons who would be substantially affected by the
decision." 5 U.S.C. § 571(8)(A), (B) (1994 & Supp. 111996).
57 5 U.S.C. § 573(b) (1994).
58 5 U.S.C. § 573(a).
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
disputes. Fourth, the parties who will participate in the process should be
clearly identified. 59
In general terms, under the ADRA only information provided by a
party to a neutral in confidence, 60 or information generated by the neutral
and provided to the parties in confidence, is protected. 61 The ADRA
confidentiality provisions state, with certain exceptions, 62 neither a neutral
nor a party shall voluntarily disclose or through discovery or compulsory
process be required to disclose any dispute resolution communication. 63 As
applied to the mediation model used by the Air Force, the ADRA
confidentiality rules protect only communications made between the neutral
and the respective parties during caucuses. Statements or other
59 See 5 U.S.C. § 571(10).
60 See 5 U.S.C. § 571(7).
"[Ifn confidence" means, with respect to information, that the information is
provided-
(A) with the expressed intent of the source that it not be disclosed; or
(B) under circumstances that would create the reasonable expectation on
behalf of the source that the information will not be disclosed ....
Id.
61 See 5 U.S.C. § 574(a) (1994).
62 The exceptions are listed at 5 U.S.C. § 574(a)(1)-(4) and 5 U.S.C. § 574(b)(1)-
(7). The exceptions include the following: (1) written consent of all the parties; (2) the
communication has already been made public; (3) the communication is required by
statute to be made public; (4) a court determines such disclosure is necessary; (5) the
communication is relevant to determining the existence or meaning of an agreement or
award that resulted from the dispute resolution proceeding; and (6) under certain
circumstances, when party or affected nonparty participants fail within 15 days to offer
to defend a neutral's refusal to disclose communications in response to a discovery
request, any claim of confidentiality under the statute may be waived.
63 See 5 U.S.C. § 574(a), (b) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996). Note also that the ADRA
confidentiality provisions attach only to "dispute resolution communication[s.]" 5
U.S.C. § 574(a). The following criteria are used to determine whether a
communication is protected:
1. The oral or written communication occurred between the time a neutral
was appointed and specified parties began participating until the termination of the
ADR process;
2. The communication was made for the purposes of the ADR process and
was not discoverable before the ADR process began; and
3. The information was provided by a party to the neutral in confidence or
was generated by the neutral and provided to the parties in confidence.
MCDADE, supra note 53, at 15 (citations omitted).
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communications made during joint sessions are not protected. Additionally,
written agreements by the parties to use mediation, or some other form of
ADR, and final settlement agreements are specifically excluded from
coverage. 64 The confidentiality protections included in the ADRA facilitate
early resolution of cases, a goal referred to by Senator Dirksen65 and
specifically stated in the EEOC regulations covering the processing of
discrimination complaints in the federal workplace. 66
The Air Force mediation model is structured so as to meet the
elemental requirements for ADRA coverage. First, mediation is specifically
referenced as a covered "dispute resolution [process.]" 67 Second,
mediation in the context of settling an EEO complaint (or MSPB appeal)
between a complainant and the agency, or a representative of the agency,
clearly deals with an "issue in controversy" as defined by the statute.68
Third, as previously mentioned, neutrals will be appointed, usually from
within the Air Force, to act as mediators. 69 Finally, the parties to the
dispute are clearly identified at the outset of the EEO complaint process.
Air Force mediations are covered by the confidentiality provisions of the
ADRA.
IV. CLASH BETWEEN 5 U.S.C. § 7114 AND
PRIVACY OF COMPLAINANTS
Under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, a
representative of the union shall be given an opportunity to be represented
at "any formal discussion between one or more representatives of the
agency and one or more employees in the unit... concerning any
64 See 5 U.S.C. § 571(5).
65 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
66 See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.603 (1998) ("Each agency shall make reasonable efforts
to voluntarily settle complaints of discrimination. ... ").
67 5 U.S.C. § 571(3).
68 See supra note 56 and accompanying statutory definition.
69 See supra notes 58 and accompanying text. By 1997, approximately 1000 Air
Force EEO counselors, personnelists, and judge advocates had gone through mediation
training, and currently the number is over 1500. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, supra note 7, at 62. The Air Force also established the "Mediator Mentoring
Program, under which trained but inexperienced mediators apprentice with highly
skilled and experienced mediators" in order to build a cadre of experienced mediators.
Id. at 62. Both the mentor and the training mediator are formally appointed according
to the third requisite element for ADRA coverage.
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grievance or any personnel policy or practice or other general condition of
employment." 70 The statutory language is filled with words and phrases on
which the applicability of the provision to EEO mediation proceedings
would appear to turn. The courts' and the Authority's position regarding
the applicability of 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A) to settlement discussions has
been somewhat less than uniform or predictable.
The Authority's position on whether the union's right to be present at
meetings between EEO complainants and agency representatives can best
be summarized as a "by the numbers" approach. 71 The Authority applies
the statutory language of 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A), as interpreted by case
law, to the facts, looking for four elements which, according to the
Authority, give rise to the union's representational right.72 First, there must
be a discussion. 73 Second, that discussion must be formal. 74 Third, the
discussion must take place between one or more unit employees and
management. 75 And fourth, the discussion must concern a grievance or any
personnel policy or practice, or other general condition of employment. 76
Although the Authority and the courts appear, in several leading cases, to
carve EEO settlement discussions out of the class of cases to which the "by
the numbers approach" applies, neither the courts nor the Authority have
held as much in a case directly involving an EEO complainant. Prior to
taking a close look at the legal and policy-oriented conflicts, it is necessary
to trace the meandering precedential route followed by the Authority and
the courts during the evolution of the union's 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A)
right.
70 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A) (1994) (emphasis added).
71 See Major Michael D. Drenan, USAF, Section 7114(a)(2)(A) of the Federal
Service Labor-Management Relations Statute: Formal Discussions, Their Evolution and
Expansion, 35 A.F. L. REv. 169 (1991), for a thorough discussion of 5 U.S.C.
§ 7114(a)(2)(A), its legislative history, its analytical framework as applied by the
circuit courts, and its impact on the attorney-client work product privilege.
72 See id. at 173.
73 See id.
74 See id.
75 See id.
76 See id.
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A. Fresno Service Center
The first noteworthy case in which the Authority and the federal court
addressed the conflict between a union's representational right and an
individual's right, generally speaking, to keep settlement conferences
between herself and her employer confidential was IRS, Fresno Service
Center v. Federal Labor Relations Authority.77 In 1979 Edith Calderone, a
GS-9 programmer employed by the IRS, was chosen for a position as a
programmer analyst trainee. After being informed that she would have to
accept a reduction to GS-7 to obtain the job, she contacted Kathryn
Biehaalder, union steward and executive vice president of the local chapter
of the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU). Together they
contacted the personnel office and were told that the analyst trainee job
should be graded a GS-11. 78 At Biehaalder's suggestion, Calderone filed a
grievance and an EEO complaint. Biehaalder was designated Calderone's
representative and they discussed the complaint process with the agency
EEO counselor. 79 The agency EEO counselor handed the case over to
Tommy Thompson, agency head EEO officer, who initiated an
investigation pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1613.213(a). Thompson interviewed
Biehaalder and Calderone together, then met with Calderone's supervisor.
After speaking with both parties, Thompson suggested all of them meet
together to try to resolve the complaint informally. 80 On January 2, 1980,
an EEO precomplaint conciliation conference was held between Thompson,
Calderone, Biehaalder, and Calderone's supervisor. The complaint was not
resolved. 8' The Authority issued a complaint alleging that by conducting
the precomplaint conciliation conference, the employer held a formal
discussion concerning a grievance or a condition of employment without
providing the union an opportunity to be represented at the discussion in
violation of 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A) of the FSLMRS. 82 The
Administrative Law Judge (ALU) held that the union had a right to be
present because it was a formal discussion about conditions of employment,
but that since the local's second vice president, Biehaalder, was present, no
77 706 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1983).
78 See id. at 1021.
79 See id. at 1022.
80 See id.
81 See id.
82 See id.
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violation occurred. 83 The Authority disagreed, holding that the union's
right to be present at the meeting was based on a right independent of
representing Calderone.8 4
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the Authority,
holding that the union does not have a right under 5 U.S.C.
§ 7114(a)(2)(A) to be present at an EEO precomplaint conciliation
conference. 85 First, the court said the Authority exceeded its authority
granted under the Civil Service Reform Act 86 to interpret the law covering
collective bargaining by federal employees when it undertook interpreting
and applying EEOC regulations:
The Authority's interpretation of the provisions involved here extends
beyond its designated area of responsibility and ventures into
discrimination in federal employment, a field Congress explicitly has
delegated to the EEOC .... While this court may give "considerable"
weight to the Authority's interpretation of the Labor-Management
Chapter, no such deference is owed to the Authority's reading of an
EEOC regulation or to the Authority's resolution of the conflict between
the statute and the EEOC regulation. 87
Next, the court contrasted the public interest in protecting labor
organizations and collective bargaining, supporting a union's right to be
present at formal discussions, against the privacy right accorded to an EEO
complainant under the then applicable Code of Federal Regulations
provision governing the processing of EEO complaints. 88 Resolving the
conflict in favor of the EEO complainant, the court pointed out that
"[r]equiring such confidentiality during early stages of an employment
discrimination claim serves to facilitate informal resolution of disputes and
to encourage employees with discrimination complaints to pursue and
explore their claims without fear of retribution." 89
The court also looked to the legislative history of Title VII when
commenting on the importance of confidentiality in the complaint resolution
process, citing the remarks of Senator Dirksen:
83 See id.
84 See id.
85 See id. at 1023.
86 5 U.S.C. § 7101 (1994).
87 Fresno Service Center, 706 F.2d at 1023.
88 See id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1613.213(a) (1982)).
89 Id.
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"The maximum results from the voluntary approach will be achieved if,
the investigation and conciliation are carried on in privacy. If voluntary
compliance with this title is not achieved, the dispute will be fully exposed
to public view when a court suit is filed." 110 Cong. Rec. 8,193 (1964).
Although these provisions relate to discrimination in the private sector
rather than in federal employment, they illustrate Congress' concern with
the confidentiality of EEOC investigations and its belief that such
confidentiality is important in achieving voluntary compliance with the
goals of Title VII.90
Two important factors in Fresno Service Center helped the courts and
the Authority distinguish Fresno Service Center and reduce its applicability
in later cases. First, the Ninth Circuit specifically based its finding that the
conciliation conference failed to meet 5 U.S.C. § 7114's formality
requirement on the wording of 29 C.F.R. § 1613.213. 91 Indeed, the court
identified as the "most critical circumstance" the fact that "[tihe meeting
was convened by Thompson under the EEOC procedure ... by which an
EEO counselor seeks to resolve discrimination charges in the precomplaint
stage on an 'informal basis.' Given that basis and purpose of the meeting,
the discussion was informal rather than formal." 92 In sum, reasoned the
court, since the EEOC characterizes precomplaint-which is to say
conferences taking place prior to the filing of a formal complaint-
conciliation as "informal," the Authority should have followed the plain
reading of the C.F.R. and found the conference to be an informal
discussion. 93
Second, the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the agency
and the union explicitly excluded claims of discrimination from the
grievance procedure. 94 The court held that the union's interest in being
present at formal discussions of grievances was grounded in its
responsibility to administer the CBA. 95 Because the CBA excluded
complaints like Calderone's from the grievance procedure, the court found
the "statutory EEOC procedure" to be a different and distinct mechanism
from the negotiated grievance procedure, and one in which the union had
90 Id. at 1024.
91 See id. at 1023-1024.
92 Id.
93 See id. at 1023.
94 See id. at 1024-1025.
95 See id. at 1024.
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no institutional role (applying a separate statutory process approach). 96
"Similarly," held the court, "there is no reason [the union] should have the
same rights in the EEOC procedure as it does in the contractual grievance
process. " 9 7
Having found the conciliation conference not to be a formal discussion
under 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A), the court declined to address whether the
Authority's decision violated the Privacy Act. 98
B. NTEU v. FLRA
Two years later, in National Treasury Employees Union v. Federal
Labor Relations Authority,99 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that an agency counsel's interview of a witness prior
to a Merit Systems Protection Board hearing was a formal discussion under
5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A), entitling the union to have a representative
present at the interview.100 In NTEU v. FLRA, James Lewis witnessed an
altercation between Phillip Murphy and Murphy's supervisor. Murphy lost
his job and appealed his removal to the MSPB, designating the local NTEU
to represent him at the MSPB hearing.' 01 When preparing for the hearing,
the agency attorney, John Maus, interviewed Lewis, who was to appear on
Murphy's behalf at the hearing. Maus had Lewis's supervisor contact him
and direct him to report to a management office for the interview.1 2 The
agency did not notify the union or give it an opportunity to be present at the
interview. The interview lasted twenty to thirty minutes and was marked by
extensive questioning and note taking.' 03 The NTEU filed an Unfair Labor
96 ld. at 1025.
97 Id.
98 See id. at 1024-1025.
99 774 F.2d 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
100 See id. at 1192-1193. NTEU v. FLRA reversed Bureau of Government
Financial Operations, 15 F.L.R.A. 423 (1984) (holding that an agency interview of a
witness in preparation for a MSPB hearing is not a discussion because it involved a
separate statutory process) (supplemental decision and order at 21 F.L.R.A. 69 (1986)),
essentially ending the brief interlude during which the Authority followed the "separate
statutory process" rationale the Ninth Circuit laid out in Fresno Service Center.
101 See NTEU v. FLRA, 774 F.2d at 1183.
102 See id. at 1182.
103 See id. at 1183.
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Practice (ULP) charge alleging a violation of its right to be present at what
it alleged was a formal discussion under 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A).104
The AL found that the interview was a formal discussion and that the
agency committed a ULP by failing to notify the union. 105 "The [Authority]
reversed the ALI's determination, finding that NTEU had no right to
representation because the discussion was neither 'formal' nor concerned
'any grievance or any personnel policy or practices -or other general
condition of employment." '' 10 6 The Authority also relied on the Ninth
Circuit's separate statutory process approach in Fresno Service Center.107
The D.C. Circuit rejected the Authority's and the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning that "grievances" are only those claims pursued under the
negotiated grievance procedure, and therefore that matters like EEOC and
MSPB appeals are not covered by 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A). 08 The court
found instead the interview did concern a "grievance" according to the
plain meaning of the statute. "Nothing in [the] definition [of grievance in 5
U.S.C. § 7103] restricts 'grievance' to matters raised through negotiated
procedure.... Murphy's appeal to the MSPB thus meets the statutory
definition of a grievance as an employee 'complaint' concerning a 'matter
relating to [his] employment."" 109 Having found the interview concerned a
grievance, the court had no problem saying the union had a right under 5
U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A) to representation during a discussion of that
grievance. 110
104 See id.
105 See id. at 1183-1184.
106 Id. at 1184 (alteration in original) (quoting Bureau of Gov't Fin. Operations,
15 F.L.R.A. 423, 431 (1984)).
107 See Bureau of Gov't Fin. Operations, 15 F.L.R.A. at 429.
10 8 SeeNTEUv. FLRA, 774 F.2d at 1188.
109 Id. at 1186.
110 The court pointed out that discussions of personnel policy or general conditions
of employment entitle the union to be present only if those discussions concern a
condition of employment affecting unit employees generally-as opposed to a single
person's terms and conditions. See id. The court pointed out the word "general" is not
included before "grievance" as it is before "conditions of employment" in 5 U.S.C.
§7114. See id. (citing 124 CONG. REc. 29,184 (1978) (statement of Representative
Udall)). Therefore, by contrast, any discussion of a grievance, whether with the
individual grievant or with anyone else, entitles the union to be present under 5 U.S.C.
§ 7114(a)(2)(A). See id. at 1189.
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The court also rejected the Authority's finding that the interview was
not a "formal" discussion. 111 The Authority found the interview not to be
formal because no one interviewing Lewis was in his chain of supervision
or had direct supervisory responsibilities over him. 112 The Authority also
noted that Lewis's presence at the meeting was not mandatory, that there
was no clear record evidence that advance notice of the meeting was given
to Lewis, and that no formal agenda had been distributed regarding the
meeting. 113 The court rejected the Authority's "no advance planning"
determination, reasoning "[fior an attorney and two labor relations
specialists to meet ... and in a single day interview all of the witnesses to
be called at an MSPB hearing surely indicates some advance
preparation." 114 With regard to Lewis's mandatory presence, the court held
that when strong indicators of formality are present, "such as the fact that
an employee was summoned to a meeting initiated by three management
representatives and held on management's terrain," unclear record
evidence on the point cannot "carry the day" for management. 15 And
finally, the court held erroneous the Authority's finding that the
interviewers were not management representatives because they were not in
Lewis's chain of supervision, concluding that there was no such
requirement under a 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A) analysis. 116
Several of the Ninth Circuit's conclusions in Fresno Service Center,
with which the D.C. Circuit disagreed, also merit further discussion. For
example, the court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's "assumption that the
union, as the exclusive bargaining representative of unit employees, has no
cognizable interest in being represented when a dispute being pursued under
a statutory procedure is the subject of a discussion between an employee
and an agency representative." 117 On this point the court went on to discuss
how remedies to correct statutory wrongs can impact "unit" interests (or
spill over) rather than just individual interests, and thereby implicate the
very institutional role the Ninth Circuit discounted in Fresno Service
Center. 118
111 Seeid. at 1193.
112 See id. at 1189.
113 See id. at 1189-1190.
114 Id. at 1190.
115 Id.
116 See id. at 1190-1191.
117Id. at 1188.
118 See id.
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Remedies for improper employer conduct, such as reinstatement or
retroactive seniority, also may affect other bargaining unit employees,
since a benefit or opportunity granted to one employee can mean the loss
of the same benefit or opportunity for another employee. The impact of
these individual complaints on the bargaining unit will be felt regardless of
whether the aggrieved employee opts to pursue a negotiated grievance
procedure or an alternative statutory procedure. We are therefore reluctant
to follow the Ninth Circuit's suggestion inIRS, Fresno Service Center that
the union's role in protecting the interest of the bargaining unit is
inherently restricted to those situations in which an employee pursues a
grievance through a negotiated grievance procedure. 119
The D.C. Circuit's position is that the union's institutional role at
discussions is based on the impact of a remedy on the bargaining unit, not
on whether the employee chooses a statutory procedure or the negotiated
grievance procedure. 120
[Tihe union's institutional role in these statutory grievance procedures is
obviously more restricted than its role in a negotiated grievance
procedure.... Nonetheless, although the union's institutional role may be
restricted, we do not think it necessarily is nonexistent. In the absence of
congressional intent to the contrary or any plausible alternative
interpretation of the statute by the FLRA, we find that the words of
§ 7114(a)(2)(A), which provide that an exclusive representative has the
right to be present at any formal discussion of a grievance between
management and a bargaining unit employee, assure the union a role in
the alternative procedures so long as the statutory criteria of
§ 7114(a)(2)(A) are met.121
In the quoted passage above, the D.C. Circuit makes several important
points. First, the court correctly points out the principal weakness in the
Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Fresno Service Center: that in many cases the
remedies sought by individual statutory grievants, like reinstatement,
retroactive seniority, placement preference, 122 or transfer, will spill over
119 Id.
120 See id. at 1189.
121 Id. (emphasis added).
122 See, e.g., Columbia Typographical Union No. 101, 23 F.L.R.A. 35, 35 (1986)
(indicating that the EEO complainant wanted, as part of a settlement, priority placement
in a particular position).
The position of Head Deskman-in-Charge is within the bargaining unit represented
by the Union and GPO's agreement to promote Ms. Curtis to the next available
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into bargaining unit interests whether the employee chooses a statutory
procedure, like those governed by EEOC or the MSPB, or the negotiated
grievance procedure. 123 The D.C. Circuit then acknowledges that despite
the inevitable spillover into union interests, "the union's.., role.., is
[nonetheless] obviously more restricted" in employee statutory procedures
than it is in its collective bargaining agent role.124 The court makes no
distinctions about the specific extent to which a union's role will be
restricted in relation to which statutory procedure an aggrieved employee
pursues, but makes clear that the union's right is most restricted in EEO
cases. 125 Indeed, the section cited above is followed by a footnote wherein
the court explicitly describes how, in discrimination cases, a union's
collective interest must yield to the individual interest of a discriminatee
complainant:
This case does not require us to decide what the union's rights would be
where an employee opts to pursue a grievance outside of the negotiated
grievance procedure because the union thinks that prosecution of this
specific grievance is not in the interest of the bargaining unit as a whole.
In the present case, Murphy requested NTEU to represent him at the
MSPB hearing, and NTEU accepted. We do note, however, that in the
case of grievances arising out of alleged discrimination on the basis of
race, religion, sex or national origin, Congress has explicitly decided that
a conflict between the rights of identifiable victims of discrimination and
the interests of the bargaining unit must be resolved in favor of the fonner.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.,
provides that the right of an aggrieved employee to complete relief takes
priority over the general interests of the bargaining unit. See, e.g., Franks
v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 96 S. Ct. 1251, 47 L. Ed. 2d 444
(1976) (awarding retroactive seniority to individual employee victims of
race discrimination). Similarly, a direct conflict between the rights of an
exclusive representative under § 7114(a) (2) (A) and the rights of an
vacancy foreseeably results in impact upon the remaining bargaining unit
members, as between 200 and 250 unit employees will be rendered ineligible to
apply for the next vacancy of Head Deskman-in-Charge which, without posting,
will automatically be awarded to Ms. Curtis. Promotion to the Head Deskman-in-
Charge position is one of the few opportunities open to journeymen unit employees
to move into better paying positions and ultimately to supervisory positions.
Id. at 48.
123 See NTEU v. FLRA, 774 F.2d at 1188.
124 Id. (emphasis added).
125 See id. at 1189 n.12.
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employee victim of discrimination should also presumably be resolved in
favor of the latter. Cf. IRS, Fresno Service Center, 706 F.2d 1019.126
In the footnote, the court essentially says if this were a case wherein an
EEO complainant did not want the union present, the individual's interest
would prevail over the union's. Having conceded that an individual's
interests trump the union's interest in EEO/Title VII cases, the court says
the correct test in 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A) cases-by implication in other
than EEO cases-is strictly to apply the statutory criteria unless one of two
possible alternatives are present. 127 Specifically, the court contemplates that
departure from the strict statutory criteria approach may be proper if
presented with either "any plausible alternative interpretation of the statute
by the FLRA," or if presented with "congressional intent to the
contrary." 128
Regarding "plausible alternative interpretations of the statute," 129 the
D.C. Circuit had the better argument describing the union's institutional
role in grievance discussions based on the potential spillover impact of
remedies on the bargaining unit. The interesting point is the court's
acknowledgment that, notwithstanding the bargaining unit's interest in
being represented during statutory complaint discussions, a bargaining
unit's 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A) right may be subordinated to another
interest (such as an individual complainant's privacy) based on a finding
that Congress intended the individual's interest to be superior. 130 This point
becomes critically important when applying NTEU v. FLRA to cases arising
after 1990, because although there may have been no clearly identifiable
congressional intent to subordinate the union's right in such a fashion in
1985, in 1990 with the passage of the ADRA (and its subsequent permanent
authorization in 1996), Congress spoke pretty clearly about the
confidentiality protections applicable to dispute resolution communications
made pursuant to the ADRA. 131 Most notably, Congress did not limit the
confidentiality protections applicable to dispute resolution communications
126 Id. (emphasis added).
127 See id. at 1189.
128 Id. (emphasis added).
129 Id.
130 See id. at 1189 n.12.
131 See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text discussing the confidentiality
provisions of the ADRA.
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to Title VII cases, but made them applicable to all such communications
taking place pursuant to any dispute resolution process. 132
The two important points to take away from the D.C. Circuit's holding
in NTEU v. FLRA are the following: (1) an individual EEO complainant
clearly may elect to exclude the union from his settlement discussions with
the employer based on footnote 12 of the opinion and (2) other types of
statutory complainants arguably may exclude the union from their
settlement discussions with the employer based on the confidentiality
provisions of the ADRA.
C. Columbia Typographical Union
One year after NTEU v. FLRA, the Authority again considered, albeit
not directly in the context of a 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A) case, the conflict
between an employee's interests in keeping settlement discussions with the
employer confidential and the union's representational right in Columbia
Typographical Union No. 101.133
On May 20, 1982, Ms. Sylvan Curtis filed an EEO complaint alleging
she had not been chosen for a position she applied for as a result of sexual
discrimination. The agency conducted an investigation in accordance with
29 C.F.R. § 1613 and on March 23, 1983, entered a settlement agreement
that was signed by the complainant, her representative, and the agency's
EEO complaint officer.134 The settlement provided that Ms. Curtis would
be promoted to the next available vacancy of a Head Deskman-in-Charge
on any of the three shifts in the section in which she worked. 135 The union
was first given notice of the settlement terms in a letter dated March 28,
1983.136
The case was not presented as a 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A) violation.
Rather, the issue, as framed by the Authority, was a "bypass" or "choice
of representation" case, based on an alleged violation of 5 U.S.C.
§ 7116(a)(1) and (5), in that the agency "negotiat[ed] directly with a
bargaining unit employee [during the] informal adjustment of her Equal
Employment Opportunity complaint."' 137 In his original pleading, the
132 See 5 U.S.C. § 574(a) (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
133 23 F.L.R.A. 35 (1986).
134 See id. at 35-36.
135 See id. at 36.
136 See id. at 45.
137 Id. at 35.
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General Counsel alleged that by "negotiat[ing] directly with an employee
an Informal Adjustment Agreement to resolve the employee's complaint of
discrimination[,] ... Respondent bypassed the Union and thereby failed or
refused to negotiate in good faith with the Union." 138
Although not specifically considering a 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A)
allegation, the ALJ rolled a 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A) analysis into his
discussion, noting:
If construed strictly, one could conclude that the violation found was not
encompassed by any allegation of the Complaint since the Complaint was
premised on the theory that, because an EEO complaint was a
"grievance" within the meaning of § 3(a)(9) of the Statute, the exclusion
of the Union from the negotiation of the Adjustment Agreement violated
the Statute. 139
The ALT went on to opine that "an agency is free to meet with an
employee and/or his or her designated representative to resolve, or to
attempt to resolve, pursuant to statutory procedures of the EEOC, an EEO
complaint of discrimination without notice to the exclusive bargaining
representative."' 140 Having concluded that holding EEO settlement
discussions with a bargaining unit employee without the presence of the
exclusive representative would not be a ULP, the ALJ nevertheless
concluded:
"[B]ypass" [as used by the General Counsel in his original complaint] is
sufficiently broad as to include all aspects of Respondent's duty to bargain
with the Union and specifically that it encompassed Respondent's duty to
give notice to the Union of any change of conditions of employment
resulting from the resolution of the EEO complaint and an opportunity to
negotiate concerning appropriate arrangements for bargaining unit
employees adversely affected thereby. Accordingly, I find that Respondent
violated §§ 16(a)(1) and (5) of the Statute by its failure to give the Union
notice of the change in the conditions of employment on March 23, 1983,
which resulted from its resolution of Ms. Curtis' EEO complaint, and
138 Id. at 46 (quoting General Counsel's Exhibit § l(g) 6, 9, Columbia
Typographical Union, 23 F.L.R.A. 35).
139 Id. at 50.
140 Id. at 47-48.
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affording the Union an opportunity to negotiate concerning appropriate
arrangements for bargaining unit employees adversely affected thereby.' 41
The Authority never addressed the dicta in the AlI's decision about an
agency's freedom to meet with a bargaining unit employee without
providing the bargaining unit an opportunity to have a representative attend
the meeting. Rather, it found the ALJ erred by considering the General
Counsel's original complaint, which read like a 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A)
allegation sufficiently broad to encompass a 5 U.S.C. § 7116(a)(1) and a 5
U.S.C. § 7116(a)(5) allegation. 142
Having declined to venture an opinion about how it would have ruled if
the 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A) issue were properly before it, the Authority
went on to discuss the "bypass" issue in the context of an employee's
freedom to choose her representative under EEO regulations. 143 The
Authority found no unlawful bypass occurred.144 As support for its holding,
the Authority made one of the best arguments in print why a union
representative has no right to be present during EEO settlement
conferences. First, the Authority pointed out that an individual complainant
has a right to seek an informal adjustment of his complaint at any point in
the process. 145 Second, the Authority noted:
Nowhere in those regulations is there any provision for the exclusive
representative's presence, unless the exclusive representative is the
complainant's designated representative. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit recognized the rights of the employee
141 Id. at 51. Recall, the union was first notified, according to the date on the
letter, five days later. See id. at 45.
142 The Authority stated:
[A]s the allegation that the Respondent failed to provide the Union with notice of
the settlement and an opportunity to bargain was not encompassed by the
complaint and thus was not before the Judge, the Authority concludes that the
violation found by the Judge in this regard must be dismissed.
Id. at 39.
143 See id.
144 See id. at 38.
145 See id. at 39. Compare the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Fresno Service Center,
which found the wording of the EEOC regulations differentiating between precomplaint
processing as "informal" discussions and postcomplaint filing processing as "formal"
discussions to be controlling for the purposes of a 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A) analysis.
See IRS, Fresno Service Center v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 706 F.2d 1019,
1023-1024 (9th Cir. 1983).
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victim of discrimination when it observed:
... Congress has explicitly decided that a conflict between the
identifiable victims of discrimination and the interests of the
bargaining unit must be resolved in favor of the
former.... Similarly, a direct conflict between the rights of an
exclusive representative ... and the rights of an employee victim
of discrimination should also presumably be resolved in favor of
the latter. 146
Third, the Authority concludes its analysis with a discussion which, if
applied after 1990, would set out the parameters by which the ADRA
confidentiality provisions should be understood and applied to Air Force-
conducted EEO mediations. The Authority agreed with the ALJ:
[Als a statement of general principle... while a union has no right to
participate in the informal adjustment of an EEO complaint where a
bargaining unit employee has elected to pursue the complaint of
discrimination under the EEOC regulatory process ... it may have a role
if the settlement gives rise to an impact on the bargaining unit
[spillover]. 147
146 Columbia Typographical Union, 23 F.L.R.A. at 39 (quoting National Treasury
Employees Union v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 774 F.2d 1181, 1189 n.12
(D.C. Cir. 1985)) (alterations in original). As further support for its opinion regarding
the supremacy of the rights of individual EEO complainants, the Authority included the
following:
For examples of similar conflicts in the private sector resolved in favor of the
victim of discrimination over the exclusive representative, see Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1973), which held that the individual's
right to equal employment opportunities may not be waived in a collective
bargaining agreement; International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 18, 26-27 (D.C. Cir. 1980), involving an individual
EEO complainant's paramount right to the privacy and confidentiality of his or her
EEO complaint over an exclusive representative's demand for a copy of the
complaint and the employee's identity; Airline Stewards and Stewardesses Ass'n,
Local 550, TWU, et al. v. American Airlines, Inc., 490 F.2d 636, 642 (7th Cir.
1973), concerning the right of individual class members in an EEO case to exclude
themselves from class actions brought by their exclusive representative.
Id. at 39 n.5.
147 Id. at 40.
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Although there may be more than one way to read the passage quoted
above, 148 the most reasonable understanding of the quoted language is that
while the union has no right to be present at EEO settlement discussions,
the employer is still obligated to bargain with the union over any impact
such an EEO settlement may have on other bargaining unit members.
D. Local 1857
In 1987, the Authority considered whether an agency attorney's
interview of a bargaining unit employee in preparation for an arbitration
hearing at which the employee was to appear as an adverse witness
amounted to a 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A) "discussion" triggering the
union's right to be present. American Federation of Government
Employees, Local 1857149 involved a case wherein the union had filed a
grievance regarding which union steward should accompany the agency's
safety personnel on safety inspections under the master labor agreement.
Prior to the arbitration hearing, the union vice president, Solorio, notified
the agency labor relations office that she would be representing the union
and calling Timblin, a bargaining unit employee, as a witness at the
148 One way to read the quoted passage is as stated in the text above: no union
right to be present at settlement discussions, but still a requirement for the employer to
bargain over settlement impact on the bargaining unit. That interpretation is well
supported by other language in the opinion, such as the reference to EEOC regulations
that give the union no right to be present during attempts at informal adjustment of
EEO complaints. See NTEU v. FLRA, 774 F.2d at 1189 n.12. Administrative Law
Judge Naimark interpreted the passage in this fashion when applying the holding in
NTEU v. FLRA to another EEO complaint case a year later in National Treasury
Employees Union, 29 F.L.R.A. 660 (1987).
Another way to read the passage would be to understand the Authority to hold that
if actions that would potentially impact the bargaining unit were to be discussed at the
actual settlement discussion, the union's right to be present would arise. For example,
if the passage were reworded slightly- "while a union has no right to participate in the
informal adjustment of an EEO complaint where a bargaining unit employee has elected
to pursue the complaint of discrimination under the EEOC regulatory process.., it
may have a role in the informal adjustment if the settlement gives rise to an impact on
the bargaining unit"-a union would have a good argument that Columbia
Typographical Union supports the assertion that a union should be represented at EEOC
settlement discussions. However, given the context from which the passage is taken,
the phraseology used by the Authority, and the reference to other judicial precedent
establishing the supremacy of EEO complainant rights over union collective rights,
such a reading would be strained at best.
149 29 F.L.R.A. 594 (1987).
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arbitration. Solorio never notified Timblin that she would be calling him. 150
Thereafter, Schra, an agency labor relations specialist, called Timblin and
asked him to meet with Wagonner (an agency attorney) the next Tuesday to
discuss how he assigned safety inspection duties, among other things.
Tuesday morning, while talking to the union's business agent about another
matter, Wagonner said that he would have to cut his conversation short in
order to interview Timblin for the upcoming arbitration.151 The business
agent asked Wagonner if he was aware that according to recent case law the
union had a right to attend such discussions. Wagonner said that he did not
think the case applied to the interview he intended to conduct and ended the
conversation. 152 The meeting was held between Wagonner, Timblin, Schra,
and Boffin (a labor relations officer) as previously scheduled by Schra. 153
The agency argued, inter alia, that the meeting was not a discussion
under 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A), and that even if it was a discussion it was
not "formal." 154 The Authority ran through its "by the numbers" approach
when analyzing the facts of the case to determine if a formal discussion was
held.
The Authority has consistently held that a formal discussion within the
meaning of section 7114(a)(2)(A) exists only if all the elements of that
section are present: there must be (1) a discussion; (2) which is formal;
(3) between one or more representatives of the agency and one or more
employees in the unit or their representatives; (4) concerning any
grievance or personnel policy or practices or other general condition of
employment.155
Holding that the meeting was a discussion, the Authority first noted the
broad meaning given to the word "discussion" for 5 U.S.C.
§7114(a)(2)(A) purposes under Authority precedent, reaffirming that
"management [must] give the employees' exclusive representative adequate
prior notice of, and an opportunity to be present at, [a] meeting even if the
meeting was called for the purpose of making a statement or announcement
rather than to engender dialogue." 156 Moreover, reasoned the Authority:
150 See id. at 595.
151 See id.
152 See id.
153 See id.
154 See id. at 596-597.
155 Id. at 597-598.
156 Id. at 598.
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"[WIhen an employer interviews an adverse witness rather than his own
or even a neutral witness, common sense suggests that the situation carries
a greater potential for intimidation or coercion." When the May 20
meeting is considered in light of the overall purpose of section
7114(a)(2)(A) [safeguarding union interests], it is readily apparent that the
Union had a representational interest to safeguard in any discussion
occurring at this meeting-the assurance that its witness was not coerced
or intimidated prior to his appearance at the scheduled arbitration hearing.
A union, as a party to the bilateral process of arbitration, clearly has a
stake in assuring that the process is carried out in a fair and impartial
manner. Its presence at such meetings will assist in providing that
assurance.
157
Then, examining the totality of the facts surrounding the discussion,
including that an agency lawyer conducted the interview with two other
labor relations specialists present, that the agency counsel asked questions
and took notes, that Timblin had been asked to attend in advance, that the
subject matter of the meeting had been determined in advance, and that the
meeting was held in the agency counsel's office, the Authority found the
discussion was formal. 158
Considering the facts in more general terms, Local 1857 was about the
union's right to be present during a step in a proceeding, the monitoring of
which was part of the union's primary duties under the agreement it
negotiated with the agency-the processing of grievances up through and
including arbitration hearings. In sum, the union's role at witness
interviews conducted in preparation for arbitration is based on its
contracted, institutional role in the grievance process. On those facts, the
agency was not in a position to borrow any of the favorable "no
institutional union role" language or reasoning from Fresno Service Center,
NTEU v. FLRA, or Columbia Typographical Union because Local 1857 was
about the union's role in ensuring fairness in the negotiated grievance
process itself. 159
On the same day the Authority issued its decision in Local 1857, it
issued two decisions in other 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A) cases, each of
which contained a slightly different spin on the definition of "grievance"
under that section.
157 Id. at 598-599 (quoting National Treasury Employees Union v. Federal Labor
Relations Authority, 774 F.2d 1181, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1985)) (emphasis added).
158 See id. at 603.
159 The Authority also rejected an agency argument, not relevant here, that the
discussion was an "examination" under 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(B). See id. at 602.
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E. National Treasury Employees Union
The first of the two decisions, National Treasury Employees Union,160
involved an EEO complainant's right to exclude the union from settlement
discussions and found the agency committed no ULP by allowing such an
exclusion (but for reasons not based on the superior rights of EEO
complainants as compared to the representational rights of the union). 161 On
September 10, 1985, Lisa Anne Shea, an auditor with the agency and not a
bargaining unit member, filed an EEO complaint "in which she alleged
sexual harassment by two supervisors [that resulted] in her being denied
a ... promotion." 162 Some time later that month (the facts as recited in the
AI_'s decision do not specify a date) Shea was transferred into a bargaining
unit position as a License Fee Examiner.1 63 On January 2, Shea and her
attorney, Janet Aldrich, met with four management representatives (Alan
Rosenthal, EEO review officer; Edward Tucker, manager of the agency's
Civil Rights Program; John Cho, management representative; and Marvin
Itzkowits, hgency attorney) to discuss settlement terms. The union was not
notified of the settlement meeting. 164
When initially presented with the agency's settlement terms, Aldrich
noted that it failed to address several items Shea desired, including the
following: Shea wanted a performance appraisal changed from fully
satisfactory to outstanding; 165 she wanted to be permanently transferred to a
new job; and she wanted attorney's fees and other relief for "being held
back for 18 months." 166 The parties were unable to define mutually
acceptable terms, and the agreement was never signed. 167
For reasons not specifically addressed in the AUL's opinion, both
parties agreed that none of the prior Authority or judicial precedent
regarding the right of a union to be represented at settlement discussions
160 29 F.L.R.A. 660 (1987).
161 See id. at 665.
162Id. at 672.
163 See id. at 673.
164 See id. at 673-674.
165 See id. at 674; see also infra note 188 describing how raising an employee's
rating would directly impact her seniority calculation, which could have significant
effects in a Reduction in Force.
166 National Treasury Employees Union, 29 F.L.R.A. at 674.
167 See id.
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between complainants and their employers applied to the case at bar. 168 The
AUD analyzed the case as one of first impression, but drew heavily on the
cases already discussed above.
Looking first to Fresno Service Center, the ALJ concluded that while
an EEO complaint appears to meet the definition of grievance in the
FSLMRS, the Ninth Circuit had held otherwise. "[Section] 7114(a)(2)(A)
[of Title 5 of the United States Code] ... does not govern the EEO
procedures in the case since [EEO procedures] are separate and distinct
from the grievance process to which Sections 7103 and 7114 of the Statute
are directed." 169 Accordingly, based on the separate statutory process
approach, the AL found Shea's EEO complaint not to be a grievance under
5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A). 170
Next, the AUJ drew on the language the Authority used in Columbia
Typographical Union:
As indicated by the Authority, nowhere in the EEO regulations is there
any provision for the exclusive representative's presence, unless the latter
is the complainant's designated representative .... Since no right attaches
to the Union to be present during negotiations to adjust such grievances
(unless the Union is chosen as the employee's representative), the role of
the bargaining representative must necessarily be limited to situations
where the adjustment or settlement impacts on the bargaining unit 171
The ALJ then referenced Columbia Typographical Union in support of
the proposition that, notwithstanding the union's nonrole in EEO settlement
discussions, the agency would have an obligation to bargain over the impact
168 See id. at 675. It is certainly understandable that the General Counsel would
agree that prior law on that point was not applicable. After all, most of it would cut
against expanding a union's role in the statutory EEO process. The General Counsel
argued that Columbia Typographical Union, as a bypass case, and not a discussion
case, was not applicable to the case at bar. See id. at 677-678. The agency apparently
argued that because Shea was not a member of the bargaining unit when she actually
filed her EEO complaint, her complaint was not a "grievance" within the meaning of 5
U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A). See id. at 679 n.7. Although it is always easier to second
guess a litigation strategy in any given case years after the fact, in retrospect, the
agency counsel's argument may have been more persuasive had he not willingly
surrendered the persuasive language from Fresno Service Center and NTEU v. FLRA.
169 Id. at 676.
170 See id. at 678.
171 Id. at 677 (again, discussing spillover).
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any agreed-upon settlements would have on the conditions of employment
of other members of the bargaining unit, or spillover.172
On review, the Authority agreed with the ALJ, but for different'
reasons, that the agency committed no ULP by failing to notify the union of
Shea's settlement discussions. 173
The Authority began its analysis by reciting the elements of a 5 U.S.C.
§ 7114(a)(2)(A) analysis: "(1) formal discussion; (2) between one or more
management representatives and one or more bargaining unit employees;
[and] (3) concerning any grievance or any personnel policy or practices or
other general condition of employment."' 174 The Authority held Shea's
settlement discussions clearly to be "formal discussions" under the
FSLMRS, but found "the discussion did not concern a grievance or a
personnel policy or practice or other general condition of employment
within the meaning of the section 7114(a)(2)(A)." 175
Shea's EEO complaint could not have been a grievance, reasoned the
Authority, because she was not in the bargaining unit at the time she filed
the EEO complaint or at the time of the events giving rise to the
complaint. 176 As such, Shea's EEO complaint, while meeting the formal
discussion elements, was held not to be a grievance. The Authority's read
of grievance appeared clearly to diverge from the D.C. Circuit's "plain
meaning of the statute" approach, 177 but there was at least a colorable
172 See id. at 679 n.6.
173 See id. at 662.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 See id. at 662-663.
177 In NTEU v. FLRA, the D.C. Circuit, when rejecting the FLRA's formulation
of grievance to be only those employee complaints pursued through the negotiated
grievance procedure, held that the plain meaning of the statute should govern. See
National Treasury Employees Union v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 774 F.2d
1181, 1185-1187 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The court found that an employee's MSPB appeal
clearly fit the statutory definition. See id.; see also National Treasury Employees
Union, 29 F.L.R.A. at 669 (Member Frazier, concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
I also do not see any reason to constrict the application of the term
"grievance" in section 7114(a)(2)(A) merely because the events that gave rise to
the employee's complaint occurred before the employee was in the unit. The literal
language of section 7114(a)(2)(A) is not limited in this manner. Section
7114(a)(2)(A) states that an exclusive representative has a right to be represented
at the discussion of "any grievance" . . . . The only limitation in section
7114(a)(2)(A) pertaining to unit status requires that the discussion at the meeting
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justification for finding Shea's complaint not to be a grievance. 178 It is in
the next part of the analysis where the Authority appeared to depart with its
own prior reasoning.
Recall that in NTEU v. FLRA the D.C. Circuit described how the
proper approach for analyzing whether the union has a 5 U.S.C.
§ 7114(a)(2)(A) institutional role in being represented at formal discussions
turns on whether the proposed settlement to correct individually defined
statutory wrongs committed by the employer will spill over into unit
interests. Specifically, the court pointed out that "reinstatement or
retroactive seniority ... may affect other bargaining unit employees, since
a benefit or opportunity granted to one employee can mean the loss of the
same benefit or opportunity for another employee."1 79 In short, the D.C.
Circuit defined the union's institutional role 180 in terms of the nexus
between the impact of a settlement agreement-the remedy-and the
interests of the bargaining unit.
In National Treasury Employees Union, the majority endorses the
spillover approach, observing "we also recognize that it is possible that a
settlement of the EEO complaint in this case, for example, reassignment or
promotion of the employee, might have affected employees in the
bargaining unit." 1 81 But, curiously, the majority continues:
In this case, we cannot conclude that the Union had any institutional
right to be represented at the January 2 meeting in order to protect what
the court identified in [NTEU v. FLRA] as a union's broader interests.
Unlike the situation in [NTEU v. FLRA], where a meeting was held with a
unit employee concerning a matter involving another unit employee, and
the effects on the bargaining unit of actions taken with respect to the latter
involve "one or more employees in the unit" . ... There is therefore no
indication in the Statute that the "grievance" must have been filed while the
employee was in the unit.
Id.
178 But see American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 648, 32 F.L.R.A. 465
(1988) (applying a broad statutory definition of "grievance" and rejecting the agency's
argument that the subject of an MSPB appeal is not a grievance if the appeal has been
dismissed with prejudice prior to the discussion).
179 NTEU v. FLRA, 774 F.2d at 1188.
180 The court defined the union's institutional role at least in so far as it should be
thought of for purposes of the "personnel policies or general conditions of
employment" part of the 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A) analysis. 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A)
(1994).
181 National Treasury Employees Union, 29 F.L.R.A. at 665.
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employee could be identified, the facts in this case differ. They
demonstrate that the EEO complaint was personal to the individual who
was not in the bargaining unit at the time of the events giving rise to the
complaint. Since the January 2 meeting concerned solely the settlement of
the EEO complaint where circumstances surrounding the complaint did
not involve the bargaining unit, we fail to see a connection between a
proceeding involving a non-bargaining unit concerns and the Union's right
to represent the interests of bargaining unit employees1 8 2
The majority's holding is curious because it mentions how the
circumstances surrounding Shea's complaint were personal to the
individual, 183 when the relief she wanted in her settlement agreement
involved just the type of spillover impact on the bargaining unit the D.C.
Circuit discussed in NTEU v. FLRA, the Authority discussed in Columbia
Typographical Union, and the majority discussed earlier in this very
opinion. Specifically, Shea sought, inter alia: (1) a permanent transfer to
another position, 184 an opportunity which, if granted her, would "mean the
loss of that same benefit or opportunity for another employee," 185 to quote
NTEU v. FLRA; and (2) a change in her performance appraisal from a fully
successful rating to an outstanding rating, 186 which would have effectively
given her "retroactive seniority," 187 again quoting NTEU v. FLRA.188
As to the potential spillover impact of settlement terms on the
bargaining unit, the majority offered:
[W]e have previously stated that if the adjustment of an EEO complaint
results in a change in unit employees' conditions of employment, an
agency is obligated to give prompt notice of the change to the exclusive
182 Id. at 664-665 (emphasis added).
183 See id.
184 See id. at 674.
185 National Treasury Employees Union v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 774
F.2d 1181, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
186 See National Treasury Employees Union, 29 F.L.R.A. at 674.
187 NTEUv. FLRA, 774 F.2d at 1188.
188 For example, in a Reduction in Force (RIF), employees are awarded points or
years of credit according to their prior performance appraisals. Whereas an employee
with an outstanding performance appraisal would be given credit for 20 years service
(for purposes of calculating seniority during an RIF), an employee with a fully
successful performance appraisal would be given credit for only 12 years of service.
See 5 C.F.R. § 351.504 (1998).
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representative of the unit employees and to provide the union with an
opportunity to bargain to the extent required by the Statute.18 9
What is also curious about the majority's opinion in National Treasury
Employees Union is the total absence of any discussion regarding the
superior rights of discriminatee complainants the Authority and the courts
included as a common theme in Fresno Service Center, NTEU v. FLRA
footnote 12, and Columbia Typographical Union. National Treasury
Employees Union presented the Authority with an opportunity to rule
clearly on an EEO complainant's right to exclude the union from settlement
discussions without having such a choice constituting an agency ULP;
precedent in two circuits would have squarely supported such a ruling.
However, although the Authority walked around the edges of the issue, it
did not directly address it.
To summarize the important points from National Treasury Employees
Union: (1) if there is no nexus between the events giving rise to an
employee complaint/grievance and the bargaining unit or its members,
discussions regarding that complaint/grievance do not involve a 5 U.S.C.
§ 7114(a)(2)(A) grievance; and (2) similarly, if there is no nexus between
the events giving rise to the complaint/grievance- as opposed to any
proposed settlement terms-and the bargaining unit or its members,
discussions regarding that complaint/grievance do not involve a 5 U.S.C.
§ 7114(a)(2)(A) "personnel policy or practice or other general condition of
employment." 190
F. Local 3882
It is likely the Authority steered clear of using any sweeping language
regarding settlement discussions because, in the third opinion issued the
same day as National Treasury Employees Union and Local 1857, the
Authority used the fact that a meeting between the agency and an employee
did not involve a "settlement" as a basis for determining that no 5 U.S.C.
§ 7114(a)(2)(A) discussion occurred. In American Federation of
Government Employees, Local 3882191 the Authority held the agency did
189 National Treasury Employees Union, 29 F.L.R.A. at 665.
190 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A) (1994).
191 29 F.L.R.A. 584 (1987).
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not violate 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A) by excluding the union from an
employee's oral reply to the agency's proposed thirty-day suspension. 192
On December 9, 1985, Yvon Bien-Aime was given a notice of
proposed removal by the agency. Prior to submitting his written response to
the proposal, Bien-Aime and his attorney scheduled a meeting with prison
warden John T. Hadden, a personnel officer, and a representative from
UNICOR. 193 The meeting was held on January 10, 1986, as scheduled, in
Hadden's office and lasted for about forty-five minutes, during which the
personnel officer took notes. The meeting had an established formal
agenda; Bien-Aime was to make his oral reply pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
§ 7513(b). 194 Hadden opened the meeting by restating the charges in the
notice of proposed removal. Then Bien-Aime, assisted by counsel, made
his presentation. Finally, Hadden closed the meeting by telling Bien-Aime
that he understood his concerns and would decide the 'matter as soon as
possible. Ultimately, Hadden issued Bien-Aime a letter of reprimand
instead of suspending him, and 'Bien-Aime grieved the letter of
reprimand. 195
The agency argued that the meeting was not a discussion and, picking
up on the Ninth Circuit's separate statutory process theme from Fresno
Service Center, that it involved no grievance because Bien-Aime's
suspension was merely proposed and was not a final agency action. 196 The
Authority used the case as an "opportunity to discuss fully the intent and
application of section 7114(a)(2)(A) of the Statute," 197 particularly focusing
on the "scope of the term 'grievance." ' 198 The Authority set out the "by
the numbers" approach' 99 from NTEU v. FLRA stating:
[I]n examining each of these elements, we will be guided by that section's
intent and purpose-to provide the union with an opportunity to
192 See id. at 584.
193 See id. at 584-585. The record did not indicate the meaning of "UNICOR."
See id. at 585 n. 1.
194 See id. at 585.
195 See id. at 585-586.
196 See id. at 587.
197 Id. at 588.
198 id. at 589.
199 The Authority noted:
Thus, in order for the section 7114(a)(2)(A) right to exist, (1) there must be a
discussion; (2) which is formal; (3) between one or more agency representatives
and one or more unit employees or their representatives; (4) concerning any
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safeguard its interests and the interests of employees in the bargaining
unit-viewed in the context of a union's full range of responsibilities
under the Statute. 2°°
Initially the Authority walked through Fresno Service Center and NTEU
v. FLRA and adopted the position, consistent with NTEU v. FLRA, that "a
'grievance' within the meaning of § 7114(a)(2)(A) can encompass a
statutory appeal," rejecting the separate statutory process approach. 201 The
next three points the Authority made in its "scope of the term 'grievance'
in section 7114(a)(2)(A)" discussion are particularly noteworthy. 2°2 First,
the Authority endorsed the D.C. Circuit's recognition in ATEU v. FLRA
that:
[A] union's institutional role with respect to statutory appeal matters is
more restricted than its role in the negotiated grievance procedure.
Furthermore, as noted by the court in [Fresno Service Center,] there must
be consideration given to any conflict between rights under section
7114(a)(2)(A) and those under alternative statutory appeal procedures?03
Next, the Authority described how it applied its conflict analysis in
Columbia Typographical Union in the context of an alleged unlawful
"bypass" saying:
We concluded that the informal adjustment of an EEO complaint did not
constitute a bypass of the union in that case because the direct dealings
between the employee and the management representatives occurred
pursuant to specific regulations of the EEOC [under the separate statutory
process approach]. Similarly, if there is a conflict between rights under
section 7114(a)(2)(A) and those under other statutes, we will consider that
conflict in determining whether section 7114(a)(2)(A) has been
violated. 204
grievance or personnel policy or practices or other general condition of
employment.
Id. at 588-589.
200 Id. at 589.
20 1 Id. at 590.
202 Id. at 589.
203 Id. at 590 (emphasis added).
204 Id. (emphasis added).
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To paraphrase, the Authority conceded that union rights are restricted
under statutory appeal procedures, and that such rights may properly be
subordinated to other interests when their exercise would conflict with
"other statutes."20 5 The footnote following the quote above cites NTEU v.
FLRA, "where the court discussed the need for resolution of such conflicts
when they arise," 20 6 presumably referencing the D.C. Circuit's description
of how statutory conflicts implicating Title VII disputes should be resolved
in favor of the EEO complainant and against the union. But the language in
the body of the Authority's opinion is not so limited. The Authority simply
says that when employees and management hold discussions pursuant to
other statutes the Authority should consider the conflict between 5 U.S.C.
§ 7114(a)(2)(A) and those statutes when determining if the former has been
violated. 207 The Authority, in its discussion about other statutes partially
resurrected the separate statutory process approach that had been rejected
by the D.C. Circuit. Following this case, the fact that a discussion was held
pursuant to some other statute does not end the analysis, as it did in Fresno
Service Center, but it is a factor the Authority must consider.
According to the Authority, an employee who transmits a dispute
resolution communication to his employer pursuant to the confidentiality
protections established in the ADRA, 208 which is to say during a private
caucus with a mediator, will clearly have been engaged in a discussion with
a representative of the agency. 20 9 According to Local 3882, the Authority
will be bound to consider the ADRA (as an "other statute") when
scrutinizing allegations regarding agency violations of 5 U.S.C.
§ 7114(a)(2)(A). 210 Whether the Authority will consider the union's rights
under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute superior to
the interests Congress intended to further under the ADRA remains an open
question because of the significance the Authority attached to "settlement
discussions" in Local 3882.
The Authority ultimately held Bien-Aime's meeting with Hadden and
the other management representatives did not involve a grievance because
205 See id.
206 Id. at 590 n.2.
207 See id. at 590.
208 See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text discussing the confidentiality
provisions of the ADRA.
209 According to currently applicable FLRA precedent, even an independent
contractor conducting "agency" business is a representative of the agency. See
Laborers' Int'l Union, Local 1276, 39 F.L.R.A. 999, 1013 (1991).
210 See Local 3882, 29 F.L.R.A. at 590.
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the proposed thirty-day suspension was, at the time of that meeting,
"merely a possibility. .. . In these circumstances, there was no 'complaint'
by Bien-Aime and thus no 'grievance' under section 7103(a)(9)." 211 The
Authority interpreted the D.C. Circuit's construction of 5 U.S.C.
§ 7114(a)(2)(A)'s intent as support for its conclusion. According to the
Authority, this intent turns on one of three union interests. First, the union
has an interest in knowing what management considers to be acceptable
versus unacceptable behavior.212 Second, the union has a role if a remedy
for improper managerial conduct spills over into bargaining unit
interests. 213 And third, the union has an interest in guarding against
coercion or intimidation of bargaining unit members. 214 Having defined the
union's interest according to those factors, the Authority found Bien-
Aime's oral reply not to concern a grievance, because (1) the agency's role
was--and was anticipated prior to the meeting to be- purely passive
(Hadden read the charge, listened, and said he would decide as soon as he
could), so presumably it would not be saying anything relevant to the first
factor; (2) there was no indication of coercion or intimidation (the third
factor); and (3) settlement discussions were not anticipated (the second
factor- spillover).215
Because mediations conducted pursuant to the ADRA will be entered
into specifically for the purpose of attempting to settle cases, Local 3882
can be read to establish a potentially sweeping precedent that all Air Force
mediations will implicate union interests based on the possible spillover of
remedies into bargaining unit interests.
G. Department of Veterans Affairs
In 1994, the Ninth Circuit introduced the predecision/postdecision
element to distinguish Fresno Service Center from a case involving an
agency's interviews of witnesses for an upcoming Merit Systems Protection
Board hearing in Department of Veterans Affairs v. Federal Labor Relations
Authority. 216 In Department of Veterans Affairs the Ninth Circuit upheld the
Authority's determination that agency interviews of witnesses, without a
211 Id. at 591.
212 See id.
213 See id.
214 See id.
215 See id. at 592.
216 16 F.3d 1526 (9th Cir. 1994).
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union representative present, in preparation for an MSPB hearing, but after
the agency had completed its investigation regarding the subject matter of
the hearing, was a violation of 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A). 217
In January 1988, the agency fired Gary Dekoekkoek, a bargaining unit
member, for substandard performance and for tardiness. He appealed his
discharge to the MSPB and designated the union as his representative. 218
Agency counsel, Patricia Geffner, conducted telephone interviews with
several union employees when preparing for the hearing. Prior to the
hearing, Geffner called Dekoekkoek's union representative and notified him
that she had interviewed the witnesses. 219 The union filed ULP charges
alleging, inter alia, that Geffner's interview of the witnesses without
affording the union an opportunity to have a representative present violated
5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A). The ALJ and the Authority found in favor of the
union.220
The Ninth Circuit first drew a distinction between interviews conducted
during agency investigations of alleged misconduct of bargaining unit
employees, and postinvestigation interviews of such employees that take
place at a point after which management has already decided to discipline
the union member. 221 The court held that, during an investigation, when
striking a balance between the agency's legitimate need to be able to
require employees to account for their time during an investigation and
safeguarding union interests, the balance tips in favor of the agency. 222
However, after the agency decides to take action against a union member,
"[s]ound policies support shifting the balance at that point" by guaranteeing
the union a right to be present at all formal discussions concerning that
action.223 As applied to the facts of the case, the court held that because the
agency had already determined to fire Dekoekkoek, the union should have
been afforded an opportunity to be present at all formal discussions
regarding that agency action.224
The court then retraced the Authority's "by the numbers" 5 U.S.C.
§ 7114(a)(2)(A) analysis, first considering whether Geffner's interviews of
217 See id. at 1532-1533.
218 See id. at 1529.
219 See id. at 1527.
220 See id. at 1529.
221 See id. at 1530.
222 See id.
223 Id.
224 See id.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
the bargaining unit members were "formal discussions," 225 and then
considering whether the substance of those interviews concerned a
"grievance. ' 226 The court cited the following indicia of formality when
concluding the interviews were formal discussions:
The interviews were conducted in a supervisor's or second-level
supervisor's office [where employees were called to participate in
telephone interviews], an area removed from the employee's normal work
environment. The staff attorney represented a high level of management.
The interviews lasted between five minutes and more than an hour. They
were planned in advance and concerned only one topic, Dekoekkoek's
upcoming Board hearing.227
The court declined the agency's invitation to consider the informal
purpose of the interviews, rather than the Authority-defined "indicia of
225 See id. at 1531-1532.
226 See id. at 1533-1534.
227 Id. at 1531-1532. The court listed as indicia of formality:
Generally speaking, the scope of formality within the meaning of the Statute is
extremely broad. A meeting is formal unless it is a "casual conversation or a
conversation that followed from an impromptu meeting." [American Fed'n of
Gov't Employees, Local 1857, 35 F.L.R.A. 594, 604 (1990).] See also Local
2241, 3 F.3d at 1389 (a meeting is formal unless it is a "spontaneous or chance
meetingal in the workplace"); NTEU [v. FLRA], 774 F.2d at 1190 (to escape
formality, a meeting must be an "impromptu gathering"). Within that broad
compass, whether a discussion is "formal" depends on the totality of the
circumstances. The FLRA has commonly looked to a number of specific factors to
determine formality, such as the level in the management hierarchy of the person
who called the discussion; whether other management representatives attended the
discussion; where the discussion took place; how long it lasted; how the employee
was summoned to it; whether there was a formal agenda; whether the employee
was required to attend; and whether the employee's name and comments were
transcribed. United States Dep't of Labor, Chicago, Ill. v. Am. Federation of
Gov't Employees, Local 648, 32 F.L.R.A. 69, 1988 WL 212939 (FLRA) at *4-5
(1988) ("Chicago").
Id.; accord American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1482, 45 F.L.R.A. 1332, 1335
(1992) (finding a meeting not to be a formal discussion because the disputed meeting
was held on the shop floor and lasted only ten minutes.)
Thus, neither the length nor the location of the meeting suggest that it was a
formal discussion of working conditions. In addition, it is undisputed that: (1) only
one management official, a first-level supervisor, attended the meeting; (2) no
agenda was prepared for the meeting; and (3) no notes of the meeting were taken.
Id.
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formality" to be controlling, holding that even if it were to abandon the
Authority's already well-accepted method of determining formality, the
purpose of the meeting was plainly not informal. 228 "Preparation for a
Board hearing is not an informal goal, and assessing the testimony of
potentially adverse witnesses is not an informal undertaking." 229
Interestingly, when distinguishing Fresno Service Center the court (as
did the Authority in National Treasury Employees Union)'said nothing
about Fresno Service Center being different based on the supremacy of an
individual's rights in a discrimination case as compared to an individual's
rights in a case not implicating Title VII. Rather, the court reiterated that it
characterized the discussion in Fresno Service Center as informal, only
because the EEOC regulations covering precomplaint conciliation
conferences characterized them that way. 230 The court went on:
Under that framework, the employee was required to try to resolve a
complaint on an informal basis. ... Here, however, no comparable
regulatory scheme exists. The record reflects no statutory or regulatory
framework that either encourages or requires an employee to attempt to
resolve complaints informally. Certainly, here, no Board regulation
explicitly or implicitly defines the interviews as informal rather than as
formal discussions. To the contrary, the interviews were part of the formal
grievance procedure. They were not an effort to preempt the formal
process, but a step towards, and a part of, the culmination of that process.
For these reasons, we find that the FLRA acted within its authority in
ruling that the interviews were formal within the meaning of the
Statute.231
Although the record may have contained no statutory or regulatory
framework encouraging informal resolution of complaints, the ADRA of
1990 certainly did. Section 3 spoke strongly regarding, although did not
specifically direct, federal agencies' obligation to begin using ADR
methods, including mediation and conciliation, to resolve disputes in
connection with litigation brought by or against the agency, such as
personnel actions. 232 In 1996, the law was reworded to more pointedly
direct agency action: "[Agencies must] consult with the agency designated
228 Department of Veterans Affairs, 16 F.3d at 1532.
229 Id.
230 See id.
231 Id. (emphasis added).
232 See Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, Pub. L. No. 101-552, § 3, 104
Stat. 2736, 2736-2737"(1990).
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by, or the interagency committee designated or established by, the
President under section 573 of title 5, United States Code, to facilitate and
encourage agency use of alternative dispute resolution under subchapter IV
of chapter 5 of such title" 233 and "examine alternative means of resolving
disputes. " 234
The ADR methods encouraged by the 1996 Act, including the Air
Force mediation model, are precisely the type of "effort to preempt the
formal process," the court strongly implied it would have characterized as
informal in Department of Veterans Affairs.235 Although consideration of
the strong ADRA preference for informal settlement of all sorts of
grievances may not have- and rightly probably should not have-changed
the outcome of the formality analysis in a witness interview case like
Department of Veterans Affairs, the court's formality preempting factor
squarely mitigates against finding Air Force-conducted mediations of
employee complaints (EEO and MSPB) to be formal discussions for
purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A).
When analyzing the grievance prong, the court referred to the broad
definition of the term in 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(9).2 36 The court rejected the
agency's argument that the case did not concern a grievance because
Dekoekkoek was pursuing his claim via a statutory right of action rather
than through the negotiated grievance process- a separate statutory process
argument-and specifically adopted the D.C. Circuit's broad, statutory-
based definition of grievance in NTEU v. FLRA. 237 In doing so, the court
contrasted Fresno Service Center, a case involving "a charge filed under
Title VII, a Congressional enactment unconnected to the Statute" with the
case at bar in which an employee charge was filed under "a statute that
Congress enacted to implement its finding that 'labor organizations and
collective bargaining in the civil service are in the public interest."' 238
In the wake of Department of Veterans Affairs, the following two
important indicia of formality have been added to the formal discussion part
of a 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A) analysis: (1) whether the discussion is
233 Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-320, § 4(a),
110 Stat. 3870, 3871 (1996) (emphasis added).
234 5 U.S.C. § 571(2) (1994 & Supp. H 1996) (emphasis added).
235 Department of Veterans Affairs, 16 F.3d at 1532 (emphasis added).
236 See id. at 1533.
237 See id. at 1533-1534 & n.4.
238 Id. at 1533 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (1994)); cf. American Fed'n of Gov't
Employees, Local 1857, 29 F.L.R.A. 594 (1987) (dealing with union's role in the very
process in which it was contractually obliged to be involved).
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conducted in an "effort to preempt the formal process" ;239 and (2) whether,
in light of the ADRA, there is now an unmistakable statutory and
regulatory framework encouraging agencies and employees to attempt to
resolve complaints informally.240 Both factors appear to provide agency
counsel with arguments that Air Force mediations of employee disputes are
not formal discussions.
Two 1995 cases decided by the Authority establish the superiority of an
EEO complainant's rights over a union's rights in the area of government
information practices. In National Air Traffic Controllers Association241 and
American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1594,242 the
Authority balances the government's obligation to make certain records
available under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)243 against an
individual's interests under the Privacy Act. 244
H. National Air Traffic Controllers
In National Air Traffic Controllers, the union alleged the agency
committed a ULP by refusing to provide the union with a copy of a
settlement agreement resolving a bargaining unit employee's formal EEO
complaint. 245 A union representative attended the first meeting held
between the agency and the employee following the employee's filing of the
formal complaint, but the union was not permitted to attend subsequent
meetings between the parties. Ultimately, the agency and the employee
agreed on mutually acceptable terms, which called for the employee to be
transferred to a nonbargaining unit position, and reduced the settlement to
writing.246 The agency then notified the union of the terms of the settlement
and offered to bargain over the impact of the reassignment. The agency
refused the union's request that it provide the union with a copy of the
239 Department of Veterans Affairs, 16 F.3d at 1532.
240 The term "informally" as used here is intended to indicate resolution of
employees' appeals and complaints through the use of ADR, and not as the term
"informal" was confined to a single, narrow meaning in an administrative regulation,
as the Ninth Circuit held in Fresno Service Center. See IRS, Fresno Service Center v.
Federal Labor Relations Authority, 706 F.2d 1019, 1023-1024 (9th Cir. 1983).
241 51 F.L.R.A. 115 (1995).
242 51 F.L.R.A. 530 (1995).
243 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1994).244 5 U.S.C. § 552a~o)(2)-(3) (1994).
245 See NationalAir Traffic Controllers, 51 F.L.R.A. at 116.
246 See id. at 117.
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actual agreement because the employee refused to authorize the agency to
release a copy of it to the union.247
The General Counsel argued, inter alia, that "[t]he only . . privacy
interest the employee might have in nondisclosure of the ... settlement
agreement would be to avoid revealing [the employee's] identity or the
[agreement's] specific [terms]" and that because the employee's identity
was already known, no further invasion into his privacy would occur. 248
Additionally, the General Counsel argued "that the terms of a settlement
agreement 'are not [purely personal,]' but reflect the action an agency
agrees to take in furtherance of its responsibilities under antidiscrimination
laws. " 249
The agency rebutted both assertions. First, it argued "it is difficult to
imagine a greater privacy interest in government records than an
employee's interest in protecting the personal elements of a negotiated
settlement." 250 Second, it argued that the information requested involved
no public information, because disclosure of the settlement terms "would
not contribute to the public's understanding of how the Respondent
performs its statutory duties, which promote civil aviation and establish
aviation [safety] standards. '"251 Therefore, maintained the agency, the
employee's privacy interests outweighed the insufficient public interest
articulated by the General Counsel. 252
The Authority sided with the agency, finding "disclosure. . [of the
requested record] would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy and, therefore, is prohibited by the Privacy Act."253 The
Authority explained that when an agency refuses to disclose information
requested pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7114(b)(4), alleging such release would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy under FOLA
exemption 6254 and, therefore a violation of the Privacy Act, the following
analysis is appropriate:
[A]n agency asserting that the Privacy Act bars disclosure is required to
demonstrate: (1) that the requested information is contained in a "system
247 See id.
248 Id. at 117 (alterations in original).
249 Id. at 118.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 See id.
253 Id.
254 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1994).
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of records" under the Privacy Act; (2) that disclosure of the information
would implicate employee privacy interests; and (3) the nature and
significance of those privacy interests. If the agency makes the requisite
showings, the burden shifts to the General Counsel to: (1) identify a public
interest that is cognizable under the FOIA; and (2) demonstrate how such
disclosure will serve that public interest. Although the parties bear these
burddns, we will, where appropriate, consider matters that are otherwise
apparent.255
First, with regard to public interest in the information requested, the
Authority adopted the agency's position that "the only relevant public
interest to be considered in this context is the extent to which the requested
disclosure would shed light on the agency's performance of its statutory
duties, or otherwise inform citizens as to the activities of the
Government."256 The Authority then specifically rejected the General
Counsel's assertion that the public interest in collective bargaining, or the
union's role in fulfilling its obligations under the system governing
collective bargaining was a sufficiently public purpose to be considered in a
FOIA exemption 6 analysis. 257
Nonetheless, the Authority found the record requested by the union to
involve both public and private interests. Citing Fresno Service Center and
other authorities, some from the private sector, the Authority found the
employee had a privacy right in the record requested, reasoning "Congress
and the courts have recognized the privacy interests of employees who file
discrimination complaints. ' 258  The Authority rejected the General
Counsel's argument that the employee had already lost the only privacy
interest she had in the record (i.e., her identity was already known) based
solely on the fact that the employee wished the document to remain
private. 259
255 National Air Traffic Controllers, 51 F.L.R.A. at 119.
256 Id.
257 See id. at 119.
258 Id. at 121.
259 See id. at 122. The Authority noted that the record almost completely lacked
evidence regarding the actual content of the settlement agreement.
The stipulated record does little to elucidate this matter, since the parties provided
neither a copy of the Settlement Agreement for our in camera review, nor an
agreed-upon description of its contents. However, the employee's refusal to
approve release of the agreement to the Union, Stip. at 2, para. 11, does not
support the General Counsel's cramped description of its content. Rather, it
suggests that the employee views the document as revealing information she
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The Authority also found the record requested to implicate a public
interest in that it "would shed light on agency actions taken to remedy
unlawful discrimination." 260 However, the Authority continued, "we are
not persuaded that this public interest is served by disclosing such
information in a form that identifies employees who have filed EEO
complaints and/or connects them with personal information revealed in the
agreements." 261 The Authority concluded, based on precedent from several
jurisdictions, that in cases like the one before it, wherein it would have
been impossible to sanitize the record of any information relating to a
specific individual, "the public interest that would be served by disclosing
the terms of the settlement agreement is outweighed by the invasion of
privacy that would result." 262
I. Local 1594
American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1594,263
decided two months after National Air Traffic Controllers, again considered
a case involving the FOIA balancing test, this time in the context of a
union's request for a copy of the "last chance" agreement between an
agency and an unsatisfactorily performing employee. In Local 1594, a
bargaining unit employee, after being notified of the agency's intent to
remove her for poor performance, "met with management and orally
replied to the proposed removal." ' 264 The employee declined union
representation both at the initial meeting, as well as in relation to all "other
matters connected to her proposed removal." '265 After the meeting, the
agency provided the employee with its decision, which was accompanied by
a last chance agreement that the employee signed. 266
wishes to remain private. In short, the record before us does not provide a basis
for finding that the privacy interests implicated by disclosure are minimal or
nonexistent.
Id. at 122.
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 Id. at 123.
263 51 F.L.R.A. 530 (1995).
264 Id. at 532.
265 Id.
266 See id.
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At that point, the union had two concerns. First, it argued in a letter to
the agency that the agency committed a ULP by failing to give the union an
opportunity to be represented at the oral reply meeting, which the union
viewed as a formal discussion according to 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A). 267
Second, the union wanted copies of all documents signed by the employee
concerning the agreement. 268 The agency denied the union's request for
documents based on the same reasoning asserted by the agency in National
Air Traffic Controllers; it viewed the Privacy Act as prohibiting disclosure,
noting that the employee had not requested union representation in the
matter. 26
9
In finding the information requested by the union to be protected by the
Privacy Act, the Authority retraced the analytical steps it followed in
National Air Traffic Controllers, first laying out the respective burdens and
then restating that a union's general institutional role in the collective
bargaining process is insufficient to qualify for consideration in a FOIA
exemption 6 analysis. 270 The Authority also found that, like unsanitized
settlement agreements in EEO cases, "unsanitized information about
disciplinary and adverse actions implicates significant privacy
interests.... This finding is consistent with the conclusiors reached by
courts reviewing claims under Exemption 6 of the FOIA." 271 Also, and in
similar fashion to its reasoning in National Air Traffic Controllers, the
Authority placed significant emphasis on the fact that the employee
"refused to approve release of the last chance agreement to the Union and
chose not to have the Union act as her representative. These facts indicate
that the employee's privacy interests are implicated and that the employee
wishes not to disclose such embarrassing and stigmatizing information to
the Union." ' 272 Lastly, and again following National Air Traffic Controllers,
the Authority held "because the last chance agreement was requested for
only one name-identified employee, it is not possible to protect the identity
of the individual whose privacy is at stake." 273
267 The Authority never actually considered the 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A) claim.
"The record does not disclose whether the Union pursued its claim that the oral reply
meeting constituted a formal discussion. That claim is not before us in this case." Id. at
532 n.4.
268 See id. at 532.
269 See id. at 533.
270 See id. at 534-535.
271 Id. at 536 (citations omitted).
272 Id.
273 Id. at 537.
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In Local 1594, the General Counsel made an additional argument,
regarding the release of the last chance agreement, not seen in National Air
Traffic Controllers. Specifically, the General Counsel argued that the
agency was obligated to release the last chance agreement under the
Routine Use Exception to the Privacy Act. 274 The Authority held the
agreement was not releasable under the Routine Use Exception according to
the test set out in the September 1992 Federal Personnel Manual (FPM)
Letter 711-164.275 That letter spelled out that a union must show the
following in order to establish a routine use exception:
(1) the information is "relevant" to the express purpose for which it is
sought, meaning that the nature of the information must bear a traceable,
logical, and significant connection to the purpose to be served; and (2) the
information is "necessary," meaning that there are no adequate alternative
means or sources for satisfying the union's informational needs. In
clarifying this second requirement, the FPM Letter explains that it is to be
determined on a case-by-case basis; the union "must show that it has a
particularized need for the information in a form that identifies specific
individuals, and that its information needs cannot be satisfied through less
intrusive means, such as by releasing records with personally-identifying
information deleted." 276
The Authority compared the formality factors it considers when
scrutinizing 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A) allegations 277 to the last chance
274 See id. at 533.
275 See id. at 538-539.
2 7 6 Id. at 538 (quoting OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, U.S. CIVIL SERV.
COMM'N, LETTER No. 711-164, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL (1992)).
277 The Authority stated that:
[ln determining whether a discussion is "formal," within the meaning of section
7114(a)(2)(A), the Authority considers a number of relevant factors: (1) the
position in the management hierarchy occupied by the individual who held the
meeting; (2) whether any other management representatives attended; (3) where
the discussion took place (i.e., in the supervisor's office, at each employee's desk,
or elsewhere); (4) how long the discussion lasted; (5) how the meeting was called
(i.e., with formal advance written notice or more spontaneously and informally);
(6) whether a formal agenda was established; (7) whether employee attendance
was mandatory; and (8) the manner in which the meeting was conducted (i.e.,
whether the employee's identity and comments were noted or transcribed).
Id. at 538 (citing Laborers' Int'l Union, Local 1276, 14 F.L.R.A. 475, 477 (1984)).
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agreement278 and found nothing in the last chance agreement relevant to
any of those factors. 279 Therefore, the Authority found the General Counsel
failed to show the agreement bore "a traceable, logical, and significant
connection to the ... purpose" for which it was requested-to determine if
the employee's oral reply to the notice of proposed removal was a "formal
discussion." 280
The noteworthy points from National Air Traffic Controllers and Local
1594 are the following: (1) releasing unsanitized information regarding
specifically identifiable EEO complainants would constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy under FOIA exemption 6 and would therefore
violate the Privacy Act; (2) releasing unsanitized information regarding
disciplinary and adverse actions as they relate to a specifically identifiable
employee would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
under FOIA exemption 6 and would therefore violate the Privacy Act; and
(3) in cases where such information is sought in relation to any specifically
identifiable individual's work-related dispute, it is impossible to sanitize the
information requested to be released.
V. ANALYSIS
A number of recurrent themes emerge from the leading cases
addressing the union's right to be present during settlement discussions
between the employer and statutory grievant employees. They range from
the very general to the very detail-specific. For example, in general terms,
a person who had only an hour or so to form an opinion from the leading
cases might conclude, correctly, that 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A) does not
give unions a right to be present at settlement discussions between EEO
complainants and the agency unless the complainant has requested union
representation. 281 Additionally, that pressed-for-time reader might also
278 The agreement is not found in or attached to the opinion, but the Authority had
performed an in camera review. See id. at 539.
279 See id.
280 Id. at 540. Note also that the ADRA exempts from FOIA disclosure
requirements all covered dispute resolution communications under 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(3). See 5 U.S.C. § 5740) (Supp. 111996).
281 See IRS, Fresno Service Center v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 706
F.2d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 1983); Local 1594, 51 F.L.R.A. at 538-539; National Air
Traffic Controllers Ass'n, 51 F.L.R.A. 115, 120 (1995); National Treasury Employees
Union, 29 F.L.R.A. 660, 664-665 (1987); Columbia Typographical Union No. 101,
23 F.L.R.A. 35, 41 (1986).
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conclude that 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A) does give unions a right to be
present during postinvestigation agency interviews of witnesses in
preparation for hearings before third party neutrals. 282 The middle ground
between those two positions, and there is a good deal of it, is not quite so
easily distilled down into a set of clear rules.
A. Legal Conflicts
1. EEO Settlement Discussions
At least two circuit courts and the Authority have stated in dicta that in
the event of a conflict between an EEO complainant's right to exclude the
union from settlement discussions and a union's right to be present (and in
the Authority's view to be provided copies of documents related to the
settlement) have unambiguously declared the EEO complainant's privacy
rights trump the union's representational rights.283 It is troubling that
despite the sweeping nature of the language used in those cases neither the
courts nor the Authority have been willing to declare the rights of an EEO
complainant superior to the utiion's in a case actually involving an EEO
complainant. 284 Although the precedent seems pretty clear, the reluctance
282 See Department of Veterans Affairs v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 16
F.3d 1526, 1530 (9th Cir. 1994). See generally, National Treasury Employees Union
v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 774 F.2d 1181, 1188-1189 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
For a thorough discussion of a union's 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A) rights during witness
interviews, and the impact of 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A) on the attorney work product
privilege, see generally Drenan, supra note 71. Drenan argued that the D.C. Circuit's
decision in NTEU v. FLRA should not be followed because, as Drenan accurately
observes, the decision "puts management in the unenviable position of having to allow
the other side access to its interviews of all bargaining unit members for hearings
before nearly any forum the agency and an employee find themselves." Id. at 194.
Despite Drenan's well founded argument that agency counsel should resist following
the potentially damaging language in the D.C. Circuit's decision, the Ninth Circuit
unfortunately has endorsed the D.C. Circuit's broad application of 5 U.S.C.
§ 7114(a)(2)(A) to such interviews. See Department of Veterans Affairs, 16 F.3d at
1530.
283 See NTEU v. FLRA, 774 F.2d at 1188-1189, 1189 n.12; Fresno Service
Center, 706 F.2d at 1023; Columbia Typographical Union, 23 F.L.R.A. at 39-41, 39
n.5.
284 See National Air Traffic Controllers, 51 F.L.R.A. at 123; National Treasury
Employees Union, 29 F.L.R.A. at 664-665. Both cases involve EEO complainants but
were resolved on grounds other than the supremacy of an EEO complainant's rights
over the union's. Compare NTEU v. FLRA, 774 F.2d at 1188-1189, 1189 n.12
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by those bodies authoritatively to rule on this issue leaves the door open,
even if only a little, for the General Counsel to attempt to insert the union's
nose where Congress (as found by the courts and the Authority) has
decided it does not belong.
Even prior to the passage of the ADRA, which now clearly provides a
"statutory or regulatory framework that.., encourages... employee[s]
to attempt to resolve complaints informally," 285 the courts and the
Authority had cited several reasons supporting an EEO complainant's right
to exclude a union from settlement discussions including the following: (1)
the Authority exceeds its charter when it attempts to interpret rules and
statutes regarding "discrimination in federal employment, a field Congress
explicitly has delegated to the EEOC";286 (2) protecting the privacy of
EEO complainants serves an important public interest; 287 and (3) the union
has no institutional role in EEO settlement discussions other than its right to
bargain with management over the spillover impact a settlement may have
on the bargaining unit.288 These arguments apply, under the language of
these cases, during any settlement discussions an EEO complainant has with
his employer, whether those discussions are covered "dispute resolution
communication[s]" 28 9 under the ADRA or not.
Since passage of the ADRA, the agency has additional arguments,
under NTEU v. FLRA and Department of Veterans Affairs, that its decision
to abide by an EEO complainant's wishes to exclude the union from
settlement discussions does not constitute a violation of 5 U.S.C.
§ 7114(a)(2)(A), so long as the settlement discussions from which the union
is excluded take place according to the requirements of the ADRA's
confidentiality provisions. Recall under NTEU v. FLRA, the D.C. Circuit
conceded that the union's representational role relating to statutory
(involving an MSPB appellant, but the court spoke in sweeping terms about the rights
of Title VII complainants in footnote 12), with Columbia Typographical Union, 23
F.L.R.A. at 41 (involving an EEO complainant where the ALU apparently followed
sweeping language from NTEU v. FLRA and offered dicta on the right of the agency to
discuss an EEO settlement with a complainant without notifying the union, but the
Authority ruled on other grounds, avoiding the " supremacy" issue entirely).
285 Department of Veterans Affairs, 16 F.3d at 1532.
2 86 Fresno Service Center, 706 F.2d at 1023.
287 See id.; see also National Air Traffic Controllerd, 51 F.L.R.A. at 120-121
(recognizing significant privacy interest of EEO complainants). •
288 See NTEU v. FLRA, 774 F.2d at 1188; National Treasury Employees Union,
29 F.L.R.A. at 660; Columbia Typographical Union, 23 F.L.R.A. at 40.
289 5 U.S.C. § 574(a) (1994 & Supp. 111996).
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complainants is "obviously more restricted" than its role under 5 U.S.C.
§ 7114(a)(2)(A) and that the union's role may therefore be subordinated to
other interests based on a finding that such subordination is what Congress
intended. 290 Additionally, recall that in Department of Veterans Affairs the
Ninth Circuit distinguished a case involving an MSPB witness interview
from the EEO settlement discussion in Fresno Service Center on the ground
that whereas the EEOC regulations covering complaint processing reflect a
framework encouraging employees to attempt informal resolution of their
complaints, no similar framework (presented in the record to the court)
applied to MSPB appeals. 291
The intent of Congress in passing the ADRA is clear: (1) federal
agencies and their employees shall implement procedures to resolve
disputes without going through formal litigation, 292 and (2) protecting the
confidentiality of communications between parties to the procedure and the
neutral is paramount. 293 Moreover, resolution of employee complaints
according to mediation is exactly the type of formality preempting statutory
framework encouraged under the ADRA that the Ninth Circuit indicated
would be significant in Department of Veterans Affairs.294 Therefore,
according to the Ninth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit, a statutory
complainant (such as an EEO complainant, or an MSPB complainant for
that matter) pursuing resolution of his complaint through a system Congress
intended to be confidential (under the ADRA) may exclude the union from
private caucuses between himself and the mediator without having the
agency's acquiescence in that request constitute a violation of 5 U.S.C.
§ 7114(a)(2)(A).
In sum, the agency should defend its decisions to exclude the union
from EEO settlement discussions altogether, arguing that judicial and
Authority precedent independent of any consideration of the ADRA
established the sanctity of the EEO complainant's right to keep settlement
discussions confidential. The agency should also argue that above the
precedentially created floor favoring the rights of EEO complainants, the
2 90 NTEU v. FLRA, 774 F.2d at 1188-1189.
291 See Department of Veterans Affairs v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 16
F.3d 1526, 1532 (9th Cir. 1994).
292 See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
293 See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text discussing the confidentiality
provisions of the ADRA.
294 See Department of Veterans Affairs, 16 F.3d at 1532.
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ADRA provides unambiguous statutory authority for the agency to exclude
the union from party caucuses with a mediator.295
The agency should defend its right to withhold final EEO settlement
agreements it enters with individually identifiable complainants under the
FOIA-Privacy Act analysis. 296 Although such documents are specifically
excluded from confidentiality coverage under the ADRA, there is no
indication in the language of the ADRA that Congress, by excluding those
documents from ADRA coverage, intended to take away from other already
existing statutory, regulatory, or precedentially created privacy rights.
2. Draft 29 C.F.R. pt. 1614
The EEOC has proposed to amend its regulations governing the
processing of EEO complaints to "require all agencies to establish or make
available an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) program for the EEO pre-
complaint process. The required pre-complaint ADR program would be in
addition to the provisions in the current regulation that encourage the use of
ADR at all stages of the complaint process." 297
The proposed changes, if imposed, would neither resolve nor
significantly alter the analysis pertaining to the conflict between 5 U.S.C.
§ 7114(a)(2)(A) and the ADRA. The proposed change in EEO regulations
would amend other procedures. However, only the amendments to the
precomplaint processing of complaints is relevant to this Article. The
proposed change requires EEO counselors to "advise aggrieved persons
that they may choose between participation in the ADR program offered by
the agency and the traditional counseling activities provided for in the
current regulation."298  Because the proposed change affects only
precomplaint processing, the rationale from Fresno Service Center and the
later cases distinguishing precomplaint activities from those that take place
after a formal complaint of discrimination has been filed is still applicable.
In sum, the proposed change, if implemented, will not change the analysis
much.
295 This is assuming the employee has not requested the union to represent him.
296 See National Air Traffic Controllers Ass'n, 51 F.L.R.A. 115, 119-120 (1995).
297 Federal Sector Equal Employment Opportunity, 63 Fed. Reg. 8594, 8595
(1998) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1614) (proposed Feb. 20, 1998).
298 Federal Sector Equal Employment Opportunity, 63 Fed. Reg. at 8595.
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3. MSPB Settlement Discussions
The agency may be able lawfully to exclude the union from settlement
discussions with MSPB appellants, but its position in such cases will likely
be less defensible than it is in EEO cases. The separate statutory
mechanism theory supports an agency's decision to exclude the union from
private caucuses during Air Force-conducted mediations of MSPB disputes.
The separate statutory mechanism theory, born in the Ninth Circuit in
Fresno Service Center, and then killed in the D.C. Circuit in NTEU v.
FLRA, was partially resuscitated by the Authority in Local 3882 in the
"discussions pursuant to 'other statutes"' portion of the opinion, wherein
the Authority held it must consider those other statutes when rights
conferred under those statutes conflict with rights conferred under 5 U.S.C.
§ 7114(a)(2)(A). 299
The separate statutory process argument, as applied to MSPB
mediations, is even more persuasive when read in combination with the
Ninth Circuit's discussion of congressionally encouraged settlement
schemes and the newly introduced "formality preempting" factor, both
raised by the court in Department of Veterans Affairs. The ADRA indicates
a clear congressional intent favoring the use of ADR in employment-related
disputes, including MSPB appeals. 300 Moreover, Air Force-conducted
mediations are precisely the type of "effort[s] to preempt the formal
process" 301 the court distinguished from witness interviews for MSPB
hearings in that case. Finally, the Authority recognized in Local 1594 that
information about disciplinary and adverse actions pertaining to a
specifically identifiable individual implicated significant privacy interests
and should not be released to a union under a FOIA-Privacy Act
299 American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 3882, 29 F.L.R.A. 584, 590
(1987).
300 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. Agency counsel may be hard
pressed to identify an MSPB rule or regulation encouraging settlement or "resolution"
as unambiguously as do the EEOC case processing regulations. Nevertheless, anyone
who has ever represented the agency or an appellant in an MSPB proceeding has no
doubt felt "encouraged" to settle cases. All of the reasons that justify protecting a
system that encourages settling EEO cases apply (for example, backed-up case loads
and swamped administrative judges) equally in the MSPB context.
301 Department of Veterans Affairs v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 16 F.3d
1526, 1532 (9th Cir. 1994).
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analysis. 302 In sum, considerable authority supports the agency's right, at
the option of the appellant, to exclude the union from private caucuses
during mediations involving MSPB appeals. 303
Although the Authority's partial resuscitation of the separate statutory
process theory in Local 3882 can be read to stand for an agency's right
lawfully to exclude the union from Air Force mediation of MSPB
complaints, another part of the opinion appears squarely to hold that an
agency may not do so. Specifically, the Authority held the union's 5
U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A) representational right during management-
employee discussions, although admittedly restricted in the case of
employee statutory appeals, turned on one of three factors. 3°4 One of those
factors was whether settlement deliberations were anticipated during the
discussions; 305 if so, according to the Authority's reasoning, the union has
a right to be present. The Authority's holding in that regard is in direct
conflict with subsequently passed legislation, the ADRA.
The language in Local 3882 conflicts with the ADRA because the
Authority defined "discussion" for 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A) purposes to
include settlement discussions. More specifically, it held the discussion that
took place in that case (appellant's oral reply to proposed suspension) was
302 See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1594, 51 F.L.R.A. 530, 536-
537 (1995).
303 But cf. Department of Veterans Affairs, 16 F.3d 1526; American Fed'n of
Gov't Employees, Local 1857, 29 F.L.R.A. 594 (1987). In both cases, the Ninth
Circuit and the Authority, respectively, drew a distinction between dispute resolution
processes in which the union's institutional role is recognized by statute or formal
agreement and dispute resolution processes in which the union has no such clearly
defined role. In Local 1857, the Authority discussed the union's institutional role in
being present for management interviews of witnesses in preparation for a grievance
arbitration hearing, a process in which the union was integrally involved. See Local
1857, 29 F.L.R.A. at 598-599. In Department of Veterans Affairs, the court discussed
the difference between a charge filed under Title VII, "a Congressional enactment
unconnected to the [FSLMRS]" with a case in which an employee charge was filed (an
MSPB appeal) pursuant to "a statute that Congress enacted to implement its finding that
'labor organizations and collective bargaining in the civil service are in the public
interest.'" Department of Veterans Affairs, 16 F.3d at 1533 (quoting 5 U.S.C.
§ 7101(a) (1994)). In MSPB settlement cases, an agency counsel arguing the agency's
right to exclude the union from such settlement discussions may be pressed for a basis
to distinguish Department of Veterans Affairs, which seems directly applicable on this
point, and Local 1857, which seems applicable by analogy. An agency counsel in such
a position should argue the conflict between those decisions and the ADRA.
304 See Local 3882, 29 F.L.R.A. at 590-591.
305 See id. at 592.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
not a 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A) discussion because settlement discussions
were not anticipated; 30 6 by implication "settlement discussion" in ordinary
parlance means "discussion" for purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A).
The ADRA is specifically intended to encourage management and
employees to, when you get right down to it, settle cases. In order to
further that objective, the ADRA includes some very strict confidentiality
provisions 30 7 that seem to fall right into place along side privacy rights the
courts and the Authority have readily recognized in other contexts. 30 8 The
upshot is whereas the Authority stated the union has a right to be present at
MSPB settlement discussions, Congress has since specifically declared that
certain settlement discussions are confidential (namely, those between a
neutral and a party under the ADRA).
When deciding how to handle MSPB mediations, agency counsel
should consider that, whether or not the union is present for discussions
between the agency and an aggrieved employee, the courts and the
Authority appear uniformly to agree that the agency is bound to bargain
over any spillover impact the remedy has on bargaining unit interests.30 9
Additionally, agency counsel should note that whereas the case law would
support an argument that a union's institutional role in the context of EEO
cases is limited to the right to bargain over spillover impact, 310 that same
argument may not be so persuasive in other fora. 311
306 See id.
307 See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text discussing the confidentiality
provisions of the ADRA.
308 See generally National Treasury Employees Union v. Federal Labor Relations
Authority, 774 F.2d 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1985); IRS, Fresno Service Center v. Federal
Labor Relations Authority, 706 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir. 1983); American Fed'n of Gov't
Employees, Local 1594, 51 F.L.R.A. 530 (1995) (addressing a disciplined employee's
privacy rights regarding disciplinary and adverse actions taken against him); National
Air Traffic Controllers Ass'n, 51 F.L.R.A. 115 (1995) (addressing an EEO
complainant's privacy rights); Columbia Typographical Union No. 101, 23 F.L.R.A.
35 (1986).
309 See NTEU v. FLRA, 774 F.2d at 1189 ("Nonetheless, although the union's
institutional role may be restricted .... we find that the words of § 7114(a)(2)(A),
which provide.., the right to be present at any formal discussion of a
grievance[,] ... assure the union a role in the alternative procedures so long as the
statutory criteria of § 7114(a)(2)(A) are met."); National Treasury Employees Union,
29 F.L.R.A. 660, 664-665 (1987); Local 3882, 29 F.L.R.A. at 591.
310 See NTEU v. FLRA, 774 F.2d at 1189; Fresno Service Center, 706 F.2d at
1023; see also Columbia Typographical Union, 23 F.L.R.A. at 38-39 (holding that no
unlawful bypass occurred when the management negotiated directly with an EEO
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4. Witness Interviews
According to Ninth Circuit's predecision/postdecision distinction in
Department of Veterans Affairs, the agency may conduct investigatory
witness interviews without affording the union an opportunity to be
present. 312 But, once the agency has made a final determination about the
matter it is investigating, the union has a right to be present at agency
interviews of witnesses in preparation for MSPB hearings pursuant to 5
U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A). 313 There are good arguments to be made regarding
the negative impact such a rule has on the fairness of the adversarial
process. For example, the rule, as held by the Ninth Circuit, affords a
union the right to have a representative present at the agency counsel's
interview of opposing witnesses in preparation for hearings before third
parties, but affords the agency no similar right. The impact of such a rule
on the attorney work product privilege is sweeping, and potentially
devastating to agency counsel. According to such a rule, it will be virtually
complainant in an effort to settle the complaint). In addition, the Authority has noted
that in the private sector, courts have found the rights of individual EEO complainants
superior to the rights of a union:
For examples of similar conflicts in the private sector resolved in favor of the
victim of discrimination over the exclusive representative, see Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1973), which held that the individual's
right to equal employment opportunities may not be waived in a collective
bargaining agreement; International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 18, 26-27 (D.C. Cir. 1980), involving an individual
EEO complainant's paramount right to the privacy and confidentiality of his or her
EEO complaint over an exclusive representative's demand for a copy of the
complaint and the employee's identity; Airline Stewards and Stewardesses Ass'n,
Local 550, TWU, et al. v. American Airlines, Inc., 490 F.2d 636, 642 (7th Cir.
1973), concerning the right of individual class members in an EEO case to exclude
themselves from class actions brought by their exclusive representative.
Id. at 39 n.5.
311 See NTEU v. FLRA, 774 F.2d at 1189 n.12, 1192-1193 (holding that a union
has the right to be present at an agency interview of a witness in an MSPB hearing and
noting that the union's right to be present is most restricted in EEO cases); see also
American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1857, 29 F.L.R.A. 594, 609 (1987)
(holding that the union had a right to be present at an agency interview of a witness in
preparation for a grievance arbitration). By implication, the union is less restricted in
other fora. •
3 12 See Department of Veterans Affairs v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 16
F.3d 1526, 1530 (9th Cir. 1994).
313 See id.
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impossible for agency counsel effectively and thoroughly to prepare a case
without telegraphing every detail. 314
The Ninth Circuit's decision applies directly to agency interviews of
witnesses in preparation for MSPB hearings and almost certainly applies to
agency interviews of witnesses in preparation for arbitration hearings. The
still unanswered question is whether, according to the partially resuscitated
separate statutory process theory, the same rule applies to witness
interviews conducted in preparation for EEOC hearings. Analytically, the
precedent does not fit. All of the judicial and Authority commentary on the
supremacy of an EEO complainant's privacy rights comes up in cases
involving settlement discussions, where the only parties to the discussion
are the complainant (and perhaps the complainant's representative) and the
agency. Once the facts move from that scenario to one involving
discussions between management representatives and other employees in
the workplace, the analysis is more difficult. On one hand, by electing to
take his complaint to a hearing, the complainant is virtually guaranteed to
give up a significant portion of his. otherwise protectable privacy right
because the agency counsel has a right to interview witnesses about all the
facts and circumstances surrounding his complaint, as well as a right to
probe into other very personal areas, such as the employee's medical and
mental health history, financial situation, and more. Additionally, the
union's institutional role of preventing coercion and intimidation of
bargaining unit member witnesses in preparation for third-party hearings in
the EEO context 315 may be tough to distinguish from witness questioning in
preparation for MSPB hearings or grievance arbitrations.
On the other hand, it is not difficult to conceive of a situation in which
the interests of the EEO complainant and the union diverge sufficiently 316
such that allowing the union to be present might place the EEO complainant
and any witnesses supporting the complainant in the position of facing two
adversaries instead of only one. Consider, for example, a case involving a
female employee's assertion of hostile environment sexual harassment,
wherein she is the only female in a section of fifteen employees. Assuming
she and the two witnesses who support her allegations can provide
information that, if substantiated, may lead to adverse actions against other
314 See Drenan, supra note 71, at 193.
315 See NTEU v. FLRA, 774 F.2d at 1192-1193; Local 1857, 29 F.L.R.A. at 598.
316 As contemplated by the D.C. Circuit in footnote 12 of ATEU v. FLRA. See
NTEUv. FLRA, 774 F.2d at 1189 n.12.
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bargaining unit members in the section, including the shop steward, her
interests would obviously be at odds with the union's.317
On facts like these, most of the language the courts and the Authority
have used when describing the comparative rights of EEO complainants and
unions would seem to support an agency's right to exclude the union from
witness interviews it conducts in preparation for EEO hearings. For
example, consider the following: the Authority is owed no deference in
Title VII matters;318 preserving EEO complainants' confidentiality serves
an important public interest;319 EEO complaints are processed according to
a separate statutory process; 320 the rights of an EEO complainant trump the
rights of the union when there is a conflict; 321 witness interviews are not
settlement discussions that would implicate any union interest based on
spillover impact;322 the union's role is obviously limited in statutory
employee appeal procedures;323 and unsanitized information about the facts
and circumstances surrounding an identifiable EEO complainant's case
implicates significant privacy interests. 324
However, while there may be some support for expanding the sanctity
of the EEO process from agency settlement discussions with individual
complainants to agency witness interviews of people with knowledge of the
facts surrounding those complaints, precedent is only marginally applicable.
The "no deference" argument does not fit neatly because unlike the
informal adjustment of complaints the Ninth Circuit encountered in Fresno
317 Consider also a case in which a complainant seeks, as a settlement term,
priority placement in a position ahead of other bargaining unit members with more
seniority. See National Treasury Employees Union, 29 F.L.R.A. 660, 674 (1987)
(stating that the EEO complainant wanted to be permanently transferred to another job);
cf NTEU v. FLRA, 774 F.2d at 1188 (discussing how "a benefit or opportunity granted
to one employee can mean the loss of the same benefit or opportunity for another
employee").
318 See IRS, Fresno Service Center v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 706
F.2d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 1983).
319 See id.
320 See id. at 1025; American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 3882, 29
F.L.R.A. 584, 590 (1987).
321 See NTEU v. FLRA, 774 F.2d at 1186-1187; Fresno Service Center, 706 F.2d
at 1025; Columbia Typographical Union No. 101, 23 F.L.R.A. 35, 38 (1986).
322 See Local 3882, 29 F.L.R.A. at 591-592.
323 See id. at 590.
324 See National Air Traffic Controllers Ass'n, 51 F.L.R.A. 115, 122-123 (1995).
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Service Center,325 witness interviews by agency counsel in preparation for a
hearing are neither unique to the EEO complaint process nor covered by
any EEO regulation. Regarding confidentiality, by the time a complainant's
case is going to a hearing, she has already given up most, if not all,
confidentiality regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding her
allegations. Likewise, it would be a stretch to argue that allowing the union
to be present during witness interviews would conflict with the
complainant's Title VII rights because those rights, as described by the
courts and the Authority, all involve some element of confidentiality in the
process, and confidentiality is for practical purposes forfeited by the
process by the time the case goes to a hearing. 326 Finally, unlike settlement
discussions with an identifiable complainant, interviews of noncomplainant
witnesses entangle an important institutional union role: preventing the
coercion or intimidation of witnesses. 327 By the time an EEO case goes to a
hearing, the agency has long since completed its investigation. Therefore,
according to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Department of Veterans Affairs
(drawing a predecision/postdecision distinction) the union has a 5 U.S.C.
§ 7114(a)(2)(A) right to be present at such interviews. 328
B. Theoretical Issues
In the grand scheme of things, and apart from the countless arguments
a skilled advocate could make based on case law, it is useful to consider
what public interests may or may not be furthered when balancing the
union's rights against the rights of an aggrieved employee. Although the
explosion in recent years of employment-related litigation bodes well for
labor and employment lawyers, 329 the rest of the non-brief-writing, non-
325 See Fresno Service Center, 706 F.2d at 1023-1024.
326 EEOC administrative hearings "are part of the investigative process and are
thus closed to the public." 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(c) (1998). But the practical aspect of
interviewing witnesses effectively opens up, at least to those witnesses, the facts and
circumstances surrounding a complainant's allegations.
327 See cases cited supra note 315.
328 See Department of Veterans Affairs v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 16
F.3d 1526, 1530 (9th Cir. 1994); see also American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local
1857, 29 F.L.R.A. 594, 598-599 (1987).
329 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 25 ("Employment litigation is a
costly option for both employers and employees. For every dollar paid to employees
through litigation, at least another dollar is paid to attorneys involved in handling both
meritorious and non-meritorious claims.").
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motion-filing, or non-issue-spotting public seems to consider all that
litigation to be a bad thing. 330 It is costly and time consuming. And the
process itself, which quite often takes on a life of its own once initiated, is
not at all well-suited to filtering out the cases that really do not need to be
resolved by a judge or jury. For that very reason, an increasing number of
courts are imposing, as a prerequisite to litigation, a requirement that
parties to a dispute at least attempt some form of ADR before they can have
their day (or perhaps days, weeks, or longer) in court.331
When parties resort to using ADR, where interest-based bargaining
instead of position-based bargaining is allowed to flourish, a significant
number of employment-related disputes are not only resolved very early in
the process, they are resolved in a fashion that is actually .beneficial to the
working relationship between the parties. 332 Mediation works because the
parties are free to explore creative ways to resolve disputes without being
bound by the strictures of the formal litigation process. As a general rule,
the less formality, the better the process works.
The problem is, at least as applied to settlement discussions, 5 U.S.C.
§ 7114(a)(2)(A) has been interpreted to allow the union to interject
formality (by insisting on participating in discussions which would
otherwise take place privately between the aggrieved employee and the
employer) 333 where such formality is demonstrably counterproductive 334
and contrary to the public good. It has never been suggested-at least to
this author's understanding-and is certainly not suggested here, that
330 See id.
[A]side from the direct costs of litigation, employers often dedicate significant
sums to designing defensive personnel practices (with the help of lawyers) to
minimize their litigation exposure. These costs tend to affect compensation: as the
firm's employment law expenses grow, less resources are available to provide
wage and benefits to workers.
Id.
331 See Frank E. Sander et al., Judicial (Mis)use of ADR? A Debate, 27 U. TOL.
L. REv. 885, 885-886 (1996).
332 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
333 See, e.g., Local 1857, 29 F.L.R.A. 594 (holding that 5 U.S.C.
§ 7114(a)(2)(A) discussions entitle the union to be present and thereby permitting the
union to interject formality).
334 See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 8, at 25 (noting the financial burden that
employment litigation places on employers and employees). " Employment litigation is
a costly option for both employers and employees. For every dollar paid to employees
through litigation, at least another dollar is paid to [the] attorneys involved .... " Id.
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unions have no business at all in the settlement of employee statutory
appeals. Indeed, the courts and the Authority uniformly agree that the
agency is always obligated to bargain with the union over any impact a
settlement has on bargaining unit interests (referred to in this Article as
spillover). 335
Because the agency is always obligated to bargain over impact, the
union's position would not appreciably be worsened if it were excluded
from settlement discussions entirely. The courts and the Authority have
already conceded that in the case of a conflict between Title VII settlements
and the union's interests, the union's rights are subordinated to those of an
identifiable victim of discrimination. 336 In Title VII cases, the theoretical
conflict between the discriminatee's rights and the union's rights seems to
have been resoundingly resolved in favor of the individual discriminatee. 337
Considering the public interest served by Title VII (eliminating
discrimination based on race, sex, nationality, or religion)338 when
compared to the public interest served by "a statute that Congress enacted
to implement its finding that 'labor organizations and collective bargaining
in the civil service are in the public interest,'"339 it makes sense to tip the
balance in favor of protecting the identifiable discriminatee over the more
amorphous public interest in collective bargaining.
In MSPB settlement cases the agency is also bound to bargain over
impact of the settlement on bargaining unit interests. The public interest in
collective bargaining would not be completely forsaken if an individual
appellant's settlement discussions with the agency were held in confidence.
Additionally, the public interest in reducing the costs associated with
resolving employment-related disputes and conserving judicial resources
mitigates in favor of guarding that aspect of the ADR process that allows it
to work-confidentiality. The unions could reasonably argue there is a big
difference between, to put it in simple terms, "asking for permission" and
335 See cases cited supra note 309.
336 See National Treasury Employees Union v. Federal Labor Relations Authority,
774 F.2d 1181, 1189 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Columbia Typographical Union No. 101,
23 F.L.R.A. 35, 39 (1986) (citing NTEU v. FLRA, 774 F.2d at 1189 n. 12).
337 See cases cited supra note 309.
338 Disability and age are now similarly protected under the Rehabilitation Act, 29
U.S.C. § 790 (1994), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 621 (1994), respectively. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.103(a) (1998).
339 Department of Veterans Affairs v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 16 F.3d
1526, 1533 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (1994)).
[Vol. 14:1 1998]
CONFIDENTIALITY OF FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE MEDIATIONS
"asking for forgiveness." 340 Fortunately, the Air Force mediation model
accommodates both the public interest in favor of ADR and the union's
interest in being involved in the decisionmaking process.
According to the ADRA confidentiality provisions, 341 as applied to the
Air Force mediation model, only a party's private caucuses with the
mediator are protected. Guaranteeing those sessions remain confidential
will allow the unfettered exploration of interest-based bargaining by the
parties, ensuring the benefits achievable through the mediation process are
still within reach. Although the ADRA falls short of dictating
confidentiality at other points in the mediation process, such as during joint
discussions, the clear weight of judicial and Authority precedent holds an
EEO complainant's right to privacy to be superior to the union's right to be
present.
VI. CONCLUSION
Experience clearly demonstrates that using mediation and other ADR
techniques serves the public good. Using ADR is efficient and allows the
parties to focus on what is important to them without having to pigeon-hole
their concerns into a specific legal theory of their respective cases.
Mediation will continue to be an effective way to resolve employment-
related disputes in the Air Force as long as the confidentiality of private'
caucuses between the mediator and the parties is strictly protected.
In EEO cases, case law prior to the passage of the ADRA soundly
established the right of an EEO complainant to elect to exclude the union
from her settlement discussions with management. Since passage of the
ADRA, the sanctity of an EEO complainant's right to privacy in settlement
discussions is even more clear, and MSPB appellant settlement discussions,
conducted pursuant to the terms of the ADRA, should also be held to be
beyond the reach of 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A).
340 In other words, the unions could argue that the difference lies in (1) being
present and involved when settlement options are being explored and discussed and (2)
being consulted after a settlement has already been reached and asked to find a way to
live with it.
341 See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text discussing the confidentiality
provisions of the ADRA.

